A Systematic Security Approach in Wireless Mesh Networks by Wang, Xia
Graduate Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
2009
A Systematic Security Approach in Wireless Mesh
Networks
Xia Wang
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wang, Xia, "A Systematic Security Approach in Wireless Mesh Networks" (2009). Graduate Theses and Dissertations. 10729.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/10729
A systematic security approach in wireless mesh networks
by
Xia Wang
A dissertation submitted to the graduate faculty
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Major: Computer Science
Program of Study Committee:
Johnny S. Wong, Major Professor
Ying Cai
Wensheng Zhang
Yong Guan
Thomas E. Daniels
Iowa State University
Ames, Iowa
2009
Copyright c© Xia Wang, 2009. All rights reserved.
ii
DEDICATION
To my parents and my husband -
Without whose love and support I would not have been able to complete this work
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Wireless Mesh Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.1 Network Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.2 Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.3 Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.4 Testbeds and Implementations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Taxonomy of Wireless Attacks in Wireless Mesh Networks . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.4 Challenges and Issues in Wireless Mesh Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.5 Contribution of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.6 Organization of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.1 Group Key Management in Wireless Mesh Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.1.2 Classification of Group Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.1.3 Centralized Group Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
iv
2.1.4 Decentralized Group Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.1.5 Distributed Group Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2 Intrusion Detection in Wireless Mesh Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2.2 Single-layer Based Intrusion Detection Methods . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.3 Cross-layer Based Intrusion Detection Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3 Intrusion Response in Multi-hop Wireless Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3.2 Existing Solutions for Intrusion Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
CHAPTER 3. A HETEROGENEITY-AWARE FRAMEWORK OF GROUP KEY
MANAGEMENT IN WIRELESS MESH NETWORKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.2 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.2.1 Trust Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.2.2 Attack Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.3 A Heterogeneity-Aware Group Key Management Framework . . . . . . . . . 32
3.3.1 A Multicast Session in WMN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.3.2 Initialization of Subgroup Leaders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.3.3 Join/Leave of a Group Member . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.3.4 Revocation of a Subgroup Leader . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.4 A Heterogeneity-Aware Group Key (HAGK) Management Scheme . . . . . . 37
3.4.1 Group Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.4.2 Threshold-based Key Agreement Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.4.3 Hierarchical Key Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.4.4 Mobility Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
v3.4.5 Reactive Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.5.1 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.5.2 Communication Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.5.3 Other Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.6 Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.6.1 Analysis of Storage Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.6.2 Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
CHAPTER 4. CROSS-LAYER DESIGN OF INTRUSION DETECTION IN WIRE-
LESS MESH NETWORKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.2 Quality Based Routing Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.3 Cross Layer Detection Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.4 Anomaly Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.4.1 Threats in Wireless Mesh Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.4.2 Feature Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.4.3 Classifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.5 Experimental Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.5.1 Wireless Mesh Network Testbed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.5.2 Implementation of System Prototype . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.5.3 Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.5.4 Attack Scenarios in WMNs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.5.5 Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
CHAPTER 5. A GENERIC MODEL FOR INTRUSION RESPONSE . . . . . . 87
vi
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.2 Response Selection Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.3 Generic Response Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.3.1 System Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.3.2 Dependency Graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.3.3 Cost Propagation Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.3.4 Cost Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.4 Damage Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.5 Response Cost Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.5.1 Operation Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.5.2 Response System Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.5.3 Response Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.6 Response Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.7 Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.7.1 Wireless Mesh Network System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.7.2 Web Service System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.8 Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.8.1 Dependency Graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.8.2 Implementation of Intrusion Response System . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.8.3 Implementation of Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.8.4 Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.9 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.9.1 Alternative Cost Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.9.2 Graph Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.10 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
vii
6.1 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
6.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
viii
LIST OF TABLES
Table 3.1 List of simulation parameters of cross-layer based IDS . . . . . . . 50
Table 4.1 Threats in wireless mesh networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Table 4.2 Feature selection for cross-layer based intrusion detection . . . . . . 62
Table 4.3 Performance of cross-layer based IDS (n=4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Table 4.4 Performance of network layer based IDS (n=4) . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Table 4.5 Performance of cross-layer based IDS (n=10) . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Table 4.6 Performance of network layer based IDS (n=10) . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Table 5.1 Attacks and intrusion responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Table 5.2 Performance of response selection system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
ix
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1 Network architecture of a wireless mesh network . . . . . . . . . . 4
Figure 3.1 WMN multicast session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Figure 3.2 Mobility management of group key management in WMNs . . . . . 44
Figure 3.3 Comparison of storage overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Figure 3.4 Average rekeying delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Figure 3.5 Rekeying delay over interval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Figure 3.6 Communication cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Figure 3.7 Communication cost for session-key update and sub-key update . . 56
Figure 3.8 Communication cost for different sizes of groups . . . . . . . . . . 57
Figure 4.1 Detection model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Figure 4.2 A wireless mesh network testbed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Figure 4.3 Detection rate for blackhole attack (n=4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Figure 4.4 False alarm rate for blackhole attack (n=4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Figure 4.5 Detection rate for greyhole attack (n=4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Figure 4.6 False alarm rate for greyhole attack (n=4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Figure 4.7 Detection rate for probe flooding attack (n=4) . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Figure 4.8 False alarm rate for probe flooding attack (n=4) . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Figure 4.9 Detection rate for blackhole attack (n=10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Figure 4.10 False alarm rate for blackhole attack (n=10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Figure 4.11 Detection rate for grey attack (n=10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
xFigure 4.12 False alarm rate for greyhole attack (n=10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Figure 4.13 Detection rate for probe flooding attack (n=10) . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Figure 4.14 False alarm rate for probe flooding attack (n=10) . . . . . . . . . . 84
Figure 5.1 A generic system model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Figure 5.2 An example of weight assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Figure 5.3 Dependency graph of a VoIP application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Figure 5.4 Dependency graph of a web service system . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Figure 5.5 Dependency graph of a mesh network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Figure 5.6 Intrusion response engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Figure 5.7 Attacking steps for a computer worm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Figure 5.8 An example of worm attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Figure 5.9 Performance of intrusion response system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
xi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am extremely lucky that I have support, encouragement, and inspiration from many peo-
ple, without them this work would not have been possible.
My greatest gratitude goes to my advisor Dr. Johnny S. Wong for his guidance and con-
sistent support. His knowledgeable, wise and inspiring discussions has guided me through my
whole Ph.D. career. It was such a pleasure to work with him for all these years. Facing so
many obstacles, I am lucky that he has always been there to show me the right direction and
influenced me as an active thinker. Thank you, Prof. Wong!
I would also like to thank other members of my committee, Dr. Yong Guan, Dr. Thomas E.
Daniels, Dr. Ying Cai, and Dr. Wensheng Zhang for their time and input. I would additionally
like to thank Dr. Guan, Dr. Daniels and Dr. Ying Cai for their guidance on my initial stages
of research and Dr. Wensheng Zhang for his insightful comments on my key management
project. I would specially thank Dr. Samik Basu for his enlightening guidance and discussion
on my research.
I am greatly thankful to my labmates, Chris Strasburg, Fred Stanley, Tanmoy Sarkar, and
Ryan Michael Babbitt for their collaboration during this research and contributions to this
dissertation. I wish to thank Tsing-yi Jiang, Yaping Jing, Taiming Feng, Tian Jiang, Wei
Zhang, Ge Xu, Chuang Wang for their support and assistance during my study.
Finally, my deep gratitude goes to my husband (Dr. Tan Guo) and my parents (Fagui Wang
and Chuxiu Liu) for their love, sacrifice and support during my life.
xii
ABSTRACT
Wireless mesh networking has emerged as a key technology to provide wide-coverage
broadband networking. It benefits both service providers with low cost in network deploy-
ment, and end users with ubiquitous access to the Internet from anywhere at anytime. Wireless
mesh networks are vulnerable to malicious attacks due to the nature of wireless communica-
tion and the lack of centralized network infrastructure. Meanwhile, the capacity of multi-
radio multi-channel communication, the need for heterogeneous network integration, and the
demand for multi-hop wireless communication often make traditional security mechanisms
inefficient or infeasible. Therefore, wireless mesh networks pose new challenges and call for
more effective and applicable solutions.
In this work, we identify the requirement for a systematic security framework to protect
wireless mesh networks and provide a security system with heterogeneity-aware intrusion pre-
vention mechanism, cross-layer based intrusion detection technique, and a generic intrusion
response model.
Our major contributions lie in the following: (1) We identify the architecture heterogeneity
of wireless mesh networks and proposed a novel heterogeneity-aware group key management
framework which combines the logical key hierarchical technique together with the localized
threshold-based technique. (2) To leverage link-aware routing characteristics, we present a
cross-layer based anomaly detection model which utilizes machine learning algorithms for
profile training and intrusion detection. (3) We address the automatic intrusion response prob-
lem in wireless mesh network by providing a generic response model to describe the depen-
dency of system services and resources. The dependency graph is later used for damage cost
xiii
assessment and response cost evaluation. (4) We build a wireless mesh network testbed and
implemented a system prototype for intrusion detection system. Our simulation and experi-
ment results show that our solutions outperform existing ones and are practical for wireless
mesh networks in terms of communication overhead and performance speed.
1CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW
1.1 Introduction
Wireless mesh networking has emerged as a key technology to provide wide-coverage
broadband networking. It benefits both service providers with low cost in network deploy-
ment, and end users with ubiquitous access to the Internet from anywhere at anytime [15]. A
wireless mesh network (WMN) is composed of a wireless infrastructure and associated client
networks. The wireless infrastructure, normally called wireless mesh backbone, contains a set
of mesh nodes (or mesh routers) which could be either static or dynamic and self-form a multi-
hop wireless ad hoc network to relay data from client networks. A wireless device can either
directly connect to a mesh router or indirectly associate with the backbone through various
wireless networks, such as wireless ad hoc networks, sensor networks, and WiFi networks.
Such integration is accomplished through the routing and gateway functionalities provided by
mesh routers.
Due to its promising future, WMNs have gained a lot of attention from both academia and
industry. Many testbeds are built for research purposes and commercial products are avail-
able for real WMNs. However, many issues have to be solved before its widely deployment.
For instance, the available MAC and routing protocols are not scalable; throughput drops sig-
nificantly as the number of nodes or hops in WMNs increases. Especially, communication
security and privacy over WMNs are big concerns due to its vulnerability to various malicious
attacks. For instance, adversaries can eavesdrop on wireless communication to gain confiden-
tial information. Through compromised nodes, attackers can launch DoS attacks and modify
2the content of transmitted information, thus jeopardize the confidentiality, authenticity, avail-
ability and integrity of the whole network.
Like mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs), WMNs have the properties of shared medium,
lack of traffic aggregation point, and dynamic topology. Due to those characteristics traditional
designs of security mechanisms in wired networks can not be directly applied to WMNs. In
addition, the mechanisms used in MANETs are not suitable for WMNs, either. This is due to
the reason that WMNs diversify MANETs in many aspects. Mesh nodes are usually equipped
with multiple radios. Thus, multiple channels are assigned at each node to support simulta-
neous data transmission and reception [16, 60]. The integration of various types of wireless
networks also requires heterogeneity awareness design in intrusion detection. Further, new
challenges are presented in network protocols which integrates link information in routing se-
lection to improve the performance of multi-hop wireless transmission [37]. All those present
new challenges for security mechanism in WMNs.
In this work, we provide a systematic security framework which includes intrusion pre-
vention, intrusion detection, and intrusion response system to secure WMNs.
Intrusion prevention embeds security design with the specific mechanism such that possi-
ble intrusions may be avoided. In this system, we study group key management in WMNs. We
identify the architecture heterogeneity of WMNs and proposed a novel heterogeneity-aware
group key management framework which combines the logical key hierarchical technique to-
gether with the localized threshold-based technique. Specifically, a WMN multicast session
involves both static backbone nodes and mobile client nodes: for backbone nodes which are
topologically-stable but may spread over a large area, the localized threshold-based group
key management technique is applied since the technique requires stable network topology
and its rekeying delay is independent of network scale; for client nodes associated with each
backbone node which are mobile but confined in a limited area, the logical key hierarchical
technique is applied since the technique is resilient to node mobility but its rekeying delay is
proportional to the network scale.
3Intrusion prevention is the first protection line in a security system. However, once the
first defense line is penetrated, intrusion detection system is required to detect attacks and
generate alerts. Network intrusion detection often concentrated on analyzing network traffic.
In WMNs, new routing metrics are designed to accommodate multi-radio and multi-channel
characteristics and provide high performance throughput. The wireless link quality is in-
tegrated with routing selection. In this case, cross-layer design is a necessity of intrusion
detection design. We present a cross-layer based anomaly detection model which utilizing
machine learning algorithms for profile training and intrusion detection. Statistical features
from both network layer and data link layer are collected and processed. We have imple-
mented the anomaly detection model on a WMN testbed. Experimental results have shown
that cross-layer based method has higher detection rate and lower false alarm rate on the aver-
age, comparing to single-layer (e.g. network layer) intrusion detection.
Intrusion detection is often followed by intrusion response actions which are dedicated to
minimize the effects of intrusion. Existing responses are limited to manual response which
requires network administrator to manually select actions in detection of intrusions. Among
automatic intrusion responses, a generic response model is required in describing the depen-
dency of system services, and resources, and determine the damage of intrusion and cost of
response, therefore, a proper response action can be selected.
1.2 Wireless Mesh Network
1.2.1 Network Architecture
The network architecture of a typical WMN is presented in Fig. 1.1. Generally, a WMN
includes two components: wireless infrastructure/backbone and mesh clients. The wireless
infrastructure/backbone is a mesh with self-configuring, self-healing links among a set of
mesh routers. It can be built using various radio technologies, in addition to the mostly used
IEEE 802.11 technologies. The wireless infrastructure/backbone is connected to the Internet
4through one or more mesh routers with gateway functionalities. Mesh clients with the same
radio technologies as mesh routers can directly connect to the backbone. Others can associated
with mesh routers through client networks such as cellular networks, sensor networks, wireless
ad hoc networks, and WiMAX [77]. The integration of different client networks within WMNs
are accomplished by employing the gateway and bridging functionalities in mesh routers.
Internet
Wireless Mesh Backbone
v
u
C1
C2
C1
client networks
Figure 1.1 Network architecture of a wireless mesh network
1.2.2 Characteristics
Like wireless ad-hoc networks, WMNs use radio signal as its communication media. They
generally have distributed infrastructure and lack centralized traffic aggregation points. Net-
work topology may dynamically change due to addition or deletion of mesh nodes. Hence,
WMNs are generally considered to be a type of ad-hoc networks. However, WMNs provide
more capabilities than wireless ad-hoc networks. For instance, WMNs provide wide-area
wireless network coverage.
5In general, the characteristics of WMNs are summarized as follows:
Multi-hop wireless networks. One objective to develop WMNs is to extend the coverage
range of current wireless networks without sacrificing the channel capacity. Another objective
is to provide non-line-of-sight (NLOS) connectivity among the users without direct line-of-
sight (LOS) links. The mesh-style multi-hopping is indispensable.
WMNs support ad-hoc networking and capability of self-forming, self-healing, and self-
organization. WMNs enhance network performance due to its flexible architecture, easy de-
ployment and configuration. Its mesh connectivity provides multipoint-to-multipoint commu-
nication and fault tolerance to the network. Due to those features, WMNs have low up-front
investment requirement and the network can grow gradually as needed.
Heterogeneity. Mesh routers integrate heterogeneous networks. Thus multiple types of
network access exist in WMNS. Wireless mesh backbone in WMN provides the infrastructure
for interconnect different types of networks. Both backhaul access to the Internet and peer-to-
peer (P2P) communication are supported.
Compatibility and interoperability with other wireless networks. For example, WMNs
built on IEEE 802.11 technologies must be compatible with IEEE 802.11 standards in the
sense of supporting both mesh capable and conventional Wi-Fi clients. WMNs also need to
be inter-operable with other wireless networks such as WiMAX and cellular networks.
Mobility and power consumption constraints are different for mesh routers and mesh
clients. Mesh routers are usually stationary and do not have strict power constraints, whereas
mesh clients are mobile and they can roam between different WMN domains and are usually
battery powered.
1.2.3 Applications
The research and development of wireless mesh networking has driven by key applications
that can be widely deployed. Among them several applications have clearly demonstrated
6their promising market value. For example, broadband home networking, community and
neighborhood networking, enterprise networking, metropolitan area networking, transporta-
tion system, and health and medical systems.
The current broadband home networking relies on a single access point which is wired
to the Internet. Often there are dead zones in a house and it is costly to add more access
points to increase coverage. In addition, communication through different access points are
not efficient. WMNs can solve all these problems. By replacing the access point with multiple
mesh routers, a wide coverage and robust wireless home network can be built in which data
communication are routed through the wireless mesh backbone.
A WMN can also be built for a community or between neighborhood for data sharing
and improving connectivity. Similarly, WMNs can be applied for enterprise networking to
provide wireless connection among offices or building. In large areas, such as cities, WMNs
are economical alternative to broadband networking, especially in underdeveloped regions.
Another application for WMN is to provide instant traffic information for passengers through
infrastructure installed on trains, buses, and ferries. In addition, medical and health system
will also benefit from the high bandwidth and easy access of WMNs.
1.2.4 Testbeds and Implementations
Thrilled by its value in fundamentally resolving the limitation and significantly improving
the performance of wireless LANs, many universities and research institutes have built WMN
testbeds to study practical issues in deploying such networks as well as to test and refine
theoretical ideas to improve their practical applicability.
One of the earliest WMN testbed is Carnegie-Mellon University’s mobile ad hoc network
testbed [52]. It has seven nodes: two stationary nodes and five car mounted nodes that drive
around the testbed site. One car simulates node entering and leaving the testbed with mounted
roving node. The testbed adopts DSR routing protocol [44] for packet routing. The major
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including audio and video streams, and to study protocol design enhancements.
MIT’s roofnet [13,14] is an experimental 802.11 b/g mesh network developed at MIT that
provides broadband Internet access to users in Cambridge, MA. There are currently around
20 active nodes on the network. The testbed is used to examine link-level measurements of
802.11, to find high-throughput routes in the face of lossy links, to select adaptive bit rate, and
to develop new protocols which take advantage of radio unique properties.
Berlin Roof Net (BRN) [1] is a project run by volunteer students of the Computer Science
Department at Humboldt University, Berlin Germany. Mesh nodes are run independently by
the students with their own equipment. The objective is to study protocol design in the self-
organized and self-configuring mesh network in a large city as Berlin.
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign has built a WMN testbed to study various
form of diversity available for multi-radio multi-channel WMNs. With multiple interfaces at
each node, the network capacity is improved. However, with mesh nodes configured to the
3 non-overlapping channels in 802.11b standard, the performance does not reach 3 times of
the single-channel network performance due to the inter-channel interference. Methods to
eliminate radio interference have been studied.
The University of California, Santa Barbara MeshNet [12] is a mesh testbed composed of
25 nodes distributed on five floors in one building. Each node is equipped with multiple IEEE
802.11a/b/g wireless radios. This network is used to study scalable routing protocols, efficient
network management, and multimedia streaming over multi-hop wireless networks.
The Broadband and Wireless Network (BWN) Lab at Georgia Institute of Technology has
built a WMN testbed, called MeshGIT [2], which is composed of 15 IEEE 802.11b/g based
mesh routers. The WMN testbed is connected to the next generation Internet testbed through a
few mesh routers. On this testbed, experiments investigating the relationship between network
performance and network parameters such as distance, clustering, and backhaul placement
are conducted. Thus new protocols at different network layers and cross layer designs are
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The WMN testbed, MAP (Mesh at Purdue) [8], at Purdue University has been utilized to
study practical issues such as routing protocols, applications, and network deployment.
In this work, we have built a WMN testbed to study network security issues. The testbed is
distributed on different floors in two buildings. Each building has 10 nodes. Each node is a PC
equipped with two wireless interface cards (NIC) and configured as a mesh router. We have
implemented and evaluated our intrusion detection and response systems over this testbed.
Since WMN has been introduced some commercial products have been released. For
instance, Cisco provides Aironet 1500 series Mesh Access Point [3] which is a dual radio
system supporting a 2.4 GHz access link and a 5GHz transit link. Nortel produces Wireless
Access Point 7220 [6] for wireless mesh network. Tropos Networks [11] employs a cellula
Wi-Fi network architecture. It’s layer-3 network operation system called Tropos Sphere runs
on standard 802.11 hardware and software and allow Wi-Fi cells to inter-operate and form
a completely wireless network. Strix Systems [10] provides Access/One Network products
and solutions for wireless mesh network deployment in different environments. Microsoft
Research Lab (MSR) has implemented ad hoc routing and link quality measurement in a
software model called mesh connectivity layer (MCL) [4]. MCL implements routes by using
a modified version of DSR called LQSR, which allows wireless nodes interconnected to form
a mesh network. In the network stack, MCL sits between layer-2 and layer-3 and appears to
be another protocol running over the physical link.
1.3 Taxonomy of Wireless Attacks in Wireless Mesh Networks
Similar to MANETs, wireless mesh networks are subject to various malicious attacks.
Some of the possible attacks are summarized as follows:
• Eavesdropping: Adversaries use electronic transmitting or recording devices to monitor
wireless communications to gain critical information. It is generally the first step in
9launching further attacks in wireless networks.
• Traffic Analysis: Adversaries analyze traffic flows to deduce information from the pat-
terns of wireless communication without cracking the security system of the wireless
communication system.
• Radio Jamming: Adversaries transmit a high-power signal to disrupt or interfere with
legitimate wireless communication.
• Replay Attack: Adversaries may replay messages received from other nodes or received
previously to disturb the functionalities of wireless networks.
• Rushing Attack: Adversaries always forward ROUTE REQUEST packets more quickly
than legitimate nodes in order to increase the probability that routes with attackers will
be discovered rather than other valid routers [41].
• Wormhole Attack: Adversaries build a wormhole tunnel between two end points which
are usually multi-hops away. The message recorded at one end point is relayed to the
other end and re-broadcasted into the network, which fools the wireless nodes far from
each other to believe they are neighbors.
• Blackhole Attack: An adversary node advertises itself as having the shortest path to the
destination node whose traffic it wants to intercept. By doing this, the malicious node
can deprive the traffic from the source node.
• Packet Dropping/Selective Forwarding: A compromised node may drop all or some of
the messages that should be forwarded.
• Packet Flooding: Adversaries may send a huge amount of useless information to the
network through compromised nodes to disrupt wireless communication.
• Modification/Pollution: Adversaries can modify or corrupt the messages transmitted in
wireless networks.
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• Impersonating/Sybil Attack: A compromised node can illegitimately claim identities of
multiple legal nodes or can impersonate another legal node.
We categorize these attacks and provide the a taxonomy of wireless attacks based on dif-
ferent criteria [82].
• Attacks can have different security goals in terms of the well-known security require-
ments: Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability. For instance, eavesdropping and traffic
analysis have the target to compromise confidentiality. Relay attack, wormhole attack,
and modification/pollution affect the network integrity. Radio jamming, packet flooding,
packet dropping/selective forwarding are examples of DoS attacks, which jeopardize the
availability of network services.
• Attacks can be passive or active. Passive attacks are characterized by interception of
messages without modification. Identifying the parties involved between the communi-
cation or the traffic pattern can be significant by itself. They are very hard to be detected
and prevention is a priority. For example, traffic analysis is a passive attack and can
not be protected using encryption mechanisms solely. Active attacks either generate
new (malicious) information and/or modify existing one. One example is modifica-
tion/pollution attacks.
• Malicious attacks may have different targets in the network. Communication informa-
tion, wireless node, or network service are all possible targets. Identifying attack targets
are critical in addressing these attacks. For example, the target of sybil attacks is wire-
less nodes identities and that of eavesdropping attack is communication information.
• Attacks may occur at different network layers and can be addressed using proper mech-
anisms at that layer. For example, radio jamming is a physical layer attack that can be
addressed using advanced modulation techniques such as DSSS or FHSS, while sybil
attack occur at application layer and can be countered using authentication approaches.
11
• Attacks can be intermittent or persistent from the perspective of how long they can last.
Persistent attacks last long, but intermittent ones happen and disappear very quickly. So
in most cases, intermittent attacks do not demand us to design specific countermeasures.
We note that some complicated attacks may even consist of multiple attacks from different
categories. For example, an attack may start with eavesdropping. Once enough information is
collected for security cracking, Modification/Pollution attack can be launched. Some attacks
can happen at different layers at the same time. For instance, packet dropping is a DoS attack
that can happen at both MAC layer and network layer. Cross layer attacks are even harder to
be detected correctly. In network routing, adversaries can first attract traffic using wormhole
attack, then use packet dropping to disrupt the routing service.
1.4 Challenges and Issues in Wireless Mesh Networks
Wireless mesh networks are vulnerable to various malicious attacks and their characteris-
tics have determined that efficient mechanisms have to be provided to support a secure com-
munication system. In our work, we aim to provide a systematic security framework to address
intrusion prevention, intrusion detection and intrusion response problems in WMNs.
Group communication is a key application over WMNs. Group key management, includ-
ing group key generation, distribution, revocation, and update, plays a critical role in securing
the communication among group members. In WMNs, wireless routers are relatively sta-
tionary while wireless clients are mobile which may result with frequent group membership
changes. On group member leaving and joining the group, key has to be refreshed. Tradi-
tional methods that relying on a centralized group server for key updating are not efficient as
each key updating has to traverse the whole network. In addition, the heterogeneous network
architecture has not been addressed in group key management. These problems motivated us
to study group key management for wireless mesh networks.
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Wireless mesh networks are generally equipped with multiple radio technologies for bet-
ter performance in terms of network throughput. However, careful design has to be planned
for radio selection and channel negotiation. To leverage multi-radio and multi-channel com-
munication cross-layer design has become a necessity for WMNs. For instance, in routing
selection, a path with multiple channels may achieve better performance than a path with the
shortest hop count. Because data may get transmitted at the same time on consecutive links
if each link has been properly configured to different channels. Inspired by that, we study
cross-layer based design in intrusion detection.
Intrusion detection is generally followed by intrusion response actions. However, research
on intrusion response is still in its infancy. Most existing intrusion response rely on network
administrator to manually select and deploy response actions. Few automatic intrusion re-
sponse has been studied. However, no generic response model has been proposed for damage
assessment and response cost measurements. To provide a complete secure system, and to
study a generic model for intrusion response, we investigate the intrusion response issue in
WMNs.
1.5 Contribution of the Thesis
In this work, a systematic framework is provided for secure communication over WMNs.
The framework includes three components: a heterogeneity-aware group key management to
protect communication over the network, a cross-layer design of anomaly intrusion detection
system, and a response model that offers a generic method in damage assessment and cost
evaluation in selecting response actions. Our contributions lie in the following:
• We propose a novel heterogeneity-aware group key management framework which com-
bines the logical key hierarchical technique together with the localized threshold-based
technique. Specifically, a WMN multicast session involves both static backbone nodes
and mobile client nodes: for backbone nodes which are topologically-stable but may
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spread over a large area, the localized threshold-based group key management tech-
nique is applied since the technique requires stable network topology and its rekeying
delay is independent of network scale; for client nodes associated with each backbone
node which are mobile but confined in a limited area, the logical key hierarchical tech-
nique is applied since the technique is resilient to node mobility but its rekeying delay
is proportional to the network scale.
• We present a cross-layer based anomaly detection model which utilizing machine learn-
ing algorithms for profile training and intrusion detection. Statistical features from both
network layer and data link layer are collected and processed. We have implemented
the anomaly detection model on a WMN testbed. Experimental results have shown that
cross-layer based method has higher detection rate and lower false alarm rate on the
average, comparing to single-layer (e.g. network layer) intrusion detection.
• we propose a generic model which describes the dependencies between services and
resources in a system. The dependency relationship will be presented in a dependency
graph. In this graph cost values of services or resources are propagated down which are
later used for damage cost estimation and response cost evaluation.
1.6 Organization of the Thesis
The rest of the work is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives a literature overview of secu-
rity research in wireless mesh networks. Chapter 3 describes the heterogeneity-aware group
key management. A framework is first introduced followed by an implementation. Chapter
4 addresses intrusion detection in WMNs utilizing cross-layer based design. A system proto-
type is implemented over a WMN testbed. Chapter 5 presents a generic model for intrusion
response. A dependency graph of a system will be generated and used for damage measure-
ments and response selection. In chapter 6, we summarize the work and discuss future works.
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CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
2.1 Group Key Management in Wireless Mesh Networks
2.1.1 Introduction
Group key management plays a key role in securing communication over WMNs. Many
applications over WMNs are built based on group communication model: packets are required
to be delivered from one or more authorized senders to a large number of authorized receivers.
In order to limit the access to the data being transmitted to group members, authentication or
access control management have to be enforced in the operations. Group key management are
thus deployed.
In a secure group communication, a number of nodes share a secret encryption key(s),
called group key(s). Using the group key, a group member can encrypt its message and broad-
cast it into the network. Only the nodes that are in the same group can decrypt the message.
Efficiency is achieved for such communication because data packets need to be transmitted
once and they traverse any link between two nodes only once, hence saving bandwidth. This
contrasts with unicast-based group communication where the sender has to transmit n copies
of the same packet.
Group key management involves key generation, distribution, and key updating. A group
key is a cryptographic key such that given the cipher text there is no easy way to recover the
original message other than by knowing the correct key. The major issue in key generation is
who is responsible for key generation: a single server or a group of nodes?
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Furthermore, a group may require that membership changes cause the group key to be re-
freshed. Changing the group key prevents a new member from decoding messages exchanged
before it joined the group. If a new key is distributed to the group when a new member
joins, the new member cannot decipher previous messages even if it has recorded earlier mes-
sages encrypted with the old key. Additionally, changing the group key prevents a leaving or
expelled group member from accessing the group communication (if it keeps receiving the
messages). If the key is changed as soon as a member leaves, that member will not be able to
decipher group messages encrypted with the new key.
However, distributing the group key to valid members is a complex problem. Although
rekeying a group before the join of a new member is trivial (send the new group key to the old
group members encrypted with the old group key), rekeying the group after a member leaves
is far more complicated. The old key cannot be used to distribute a new one, because the
leaving member knows the old key. Therefore, a group key distributor must provide another
scalable mechanism to rekey the group.
A naive solution for rekeying a group with n members has the key distribution centre
(KDC) assigning a secret key to each member of the group. In order to distribute the group key,
the KDC encrypts it with each member’s secret key. This operation generates a message O(n)
long which is then transmitted to the whole group via multicast. On receiving the message, a
member can recover the group key from the appropriate segment of the message using its own
secret key.
Obviously, the naive solution is not scalable, and it frequently requires the use of secure
channels. Secure channels are not always easy to establish. For these reasons different group
key management protocols have been developed, each with different properties and perfor-
mance.
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2.1.2 Classification of Group Key Management
Group key management schemes can be divided into three main classes:
• Centralized group key management protocols. A single entity is employed for control-
ling the whole group, hence a group key management protocol seeks to minimize stor-
age requirements, computational power on both client and server sides, and bandwidth
utilization.
• Decentralized architectures. The management of a large group is divided among sub-
group managers, trying to minimize the problem of concentrating the work in a single
place.
• Distributed key management protocols. There is no explicit KDC, and the members
themselves do the key generation. All members can perform access control and gener-
ation of the key can be either contributory, meaning that all members contribute some
information to generate the group key, or done by one of the members.
2.1.3 Centralized Group Key Management
Wong et al. [79] and Wallner et al. [74] propose the use of a Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH).
In this approach, a KDC maintains a tree of keys. The nodes of the tree hold key encryption
keys (KEKs). The leaves of the tree correspond to group members and each leaf holds a
KEK associated with that one member. Each member receives and maintains a copy of the
KEK associated with its leaf and the KEKs corresponding to each node in the path from its
parent leaf to the root. The key held by the root of the tree is the group key. For a balanced
tree, each member stores at most log(n) + 1 keys, where log(n) is the height of the tree. A
joining member is associated with a leaf and the leaf is included in the tree. All KEKs in
the nodes from the new leaf’s parent in the path to the root are compromised and should be
changed (backward secrecy). A rekey message is generated containing each of the new KEKs
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encrypted with its respective node’s children KEK. The size of the message produced will be
at most 2 ∗ log(n) keys long. Removing a member follows a similar process. When a member
leaves (or is evicted from) the group, its parent node’s KEK and all KEKs held by nodes in the
path to the root are compromised and should be updated (forward secrecy). A rekey message
is generated containing each of the new KEKs encrypted with its respective node’s children
KEK. The exception is the parent node of the leaving member’s leaf. The KEK held by this
node is encrypted only with the KEK held by the remaining member’s leaf. As the key held
by the leaving member was not used to encrypt any new KEK, and all its known KEKs were
changed, it is no longer able to access the group messages.
An improvement in the hierarchical binary tree approach is a one-way function tree (OFT)
and was proposed by McGrew and Sherman [21]. Their scheme reduces the size of the rekey-
ing message from 2 ∗ log(n) to only log(n). Here a node’s KEK is generated rather than just
attributed. The KEKs held by a node’s children are blinded using a one-way function and then
mixed together using a mixing function. The result of this mixing function is the KEK held
by the node. This is represented by the following formula:
ki = f(g(kleft(i)), g(kright(i)))
Where left(i) and right(i) denote respectively the left and right children of node i. The
function g is one-way, and f is a mixing function.
Canetti et al. [29] proposed a slightly different approach that achieves the same commu-
nication overhead. Their scheme uses a pseudo-random-generator to generate the new KEKs
rather than a one-way function and it is applied only on user removal. This scheme is known
as the one-way function chain tree.
Waldvogel et al. [73] extended their own solution proposing to change the hierarchical
tree for a flat table (FT) with the effect of decreasing the number of keys held by the KDC.
The table has one entry for the Traffic Encryption Key (TEK) and 2w more entries for KEKs,
where w is the number of bits in the member id. There are two keys available for each bit in
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the member id, one associated with each possible value of the bit. A member knows only the
key associated with the state of its bit. In total, each member holds w + 1 keys.
2.1.4 Decentralized Group Key Management
RFC1949 [23] proposes a scheme to use the trees built by the Core Based Tree (CBT)
multicast routing protocol to deliver keys to a multicast group. Any router in the path of a
joining member from its location to the primary core can authenticate the member since the
router is authenticated with the primary core. This scheme requires some modifications to
the IGMP6 and assumes that CBT is deployed. Furthermore, there is no solution for forward
secrecy other than to recreate an entirely new group without the leaving members.
Mittra proposes Iolus [54], a framework with a hierarchy of agents that splits the large
group into small subgroups. A Group Security Agent (GSA) manages each subgroup. The
GSAs are also grouped in a top-level group that is managed by a Group Security Controller.
Iolus uses independent keys for each subgroup and the absence of a general group key means
membership changes in a subgroup are treated locally. It means that changes that affect a
subgroup are not reflected in other subgroups. In addition, the absence of a central controller
contributes to the fault-tolerance of the system. If a subgroup controller (namely GSA) fails,
only its subgroup is affected.
Dondeti et al. [36] proposed a dual-encryption protocol (DEP). In their work, they suggest
a hierarchical subgrouping of the members where a subgroup manager (SGM) controls each
subgroup. There are three kinds of KEKs and one Data Encryption Key (DEK). KEKi1
is shared between a SGMi and its subgroup members. KEKi2 is shared between the Group
Controller (GC) and the members of subgroup i, excluding SGMi . Finally,GC shares KEKi3
with SGMi . In order to distribute the DEK to the members, the GC generates and transmits
a package containing the DEK encrypted with KEKi2 and encrypted again with KEKi3 .
Setia et al. [62] proposed Kronos. It is an approach driven by periodic rekeys rather than
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membership changes, which means a new group key is generated after a certain period of time,
disregarding whether any member has joined, left or been ejected from the group. Although
Kronos can be used within a distributed framework, it works differently because the DKD
does not directly generate the group key. Instead, each AKD independently generates the
same group key and transmits it to its members at the end of the predetermined period.
2.1.5 Distributed Group Key Management
Group DiffieHellman key exchange [51] is an extension for the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key
agreement protocol that supports group operations. The DH protocol is used for two parties
to agree on a common key. In this protocol, instead of two entities, the group may have n
members. The group agrees on a pair of primes (q and α) and starts calculating in a distributive
fashion the intermediate values. The first member calculates the first value (αx1 ) and passes
it to the next member. Each subsequent member receives the set of intermediary values and
raises them using its own secret number generating a new set. A set generated by the ith
member will have i intermediate values with i− 1 exponents and a cardinal value containing
all exponents.
Boyd [] proposed yet another protocol for conference key agreement (CKA) where all
group members contribute to generating the group key. The group key is generated with a
combining function: K = f(N1, h(N2), ..., h(Nn)), where f is the combining function, h
is a one-way function, n is the group size and Ni is the contribution from group member i.
The protocol specifies that n− 1 members broadcast their contributions (Ni) in the clear. The
group leader, for example U1, encrypts its contribution (N1) with the public key of each n− 1
group member and broadcasts it. All group members who had their public key used to encrypt
N1 can decrypt it and generate the group key.
Zhang et al [83] present a distributed key management to address the node compromising
problem and to improve the key updating performance in sensor network. In this group key
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management, the polynomial to generate future keys are pre-deployed into individual nodes
and then appropriately processed before it is discarded. Future group keys are calculated
through the local collaboration among neighbors. Such localized collaboration demonstrated
a method to reduce cost in key updating and also achieve a reasonable level of security.
Network topology is exploited in Sun et al’s Topology-Matching Key Management (TMKM)
[66] to reduce the rekeying message in cellular network. A TMKM tree is built such that
neighboring nodes in the key tree are also physical neighboring nodes. To control message
broadcast in cellular network, base stations (BSs) and super hosts (SHs) actually hold some of
the Key Encryption Keys (KEKs) in the key tree and rekeying message is only broadcast by a
SH to its governed BSs if and only if the rekeying message is useful to one or several BSs and
by a BS to its subscribed users if and only if the rekeying message is useful to the users. In
the above method, only the last hop is considered to be wireless.
2.2 Intrusion Detection in Wireless Mesh Networks
2.2.1 Introduction
Intrusion detection can be viewed as a passive defense, similar to a burglar alarm in a
building. An intrusion detection system (IDS) attempts to differentiate abnormal activities
from normal ones, and identify truly malicious activities (attacks) from the abnormal but non-
malicious activities. Unfortunately, normal activities have a wide range of scenarios, and
attacks may appear similar to normal activities. For example, a ping is a common utility to
discover if a host is operating and online, but a ping can also be used for attack reconnaissance
to learn information about potential targets. Even if unusual activities can be distinguished
from normal activities, an unusual activity may not be truly malicious in intent.
Based on different criteria, IDSs can be divided into different categories. Depending on
the monitored events IDSs can be classified into two types: host-based or network-based IDS.
Host-based IDS are installed on hosts and monitor their internal events, usually at the operating
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system level. These internal events are the type recorded in the host’s audit trails and system
logs. In contrast, network-based IDS monitor packets in the network. This is usually done by
setting the network interface on a host to promiscuous mode (so all network traffic is captured,
regardless of packet addresses). Alternatively, there are also specialized protocol analyzers
designed to capture and decode packets at full link speed.
Based on analysis method in IDSs, three different techniques can be used: misuse detec-
tion, anomaly detection, and specification based detection. Misuse detection is also called
signature-based detection because the idea is to represent every attack by a signature (pattern
or rule of behavior). If a matching signature is found, that attack is detected. An advantage of
misuse detection is its accuracy. If a signature matches with an attack, that signature identifies
the specific intrusion. Knowledge of the specific type of attack means that an appropriate re-
sponse can be determined immediately. For its accuracy, misuse detection is widely preferred
in commercial systems. However, misuse detection is not able to detect new and novel attacks.
And new signature must be developed whenever a new attack is discovered.
Anomaly detection tries to characterize normal behavior, and everything else is assumed to
be anomalous (although not necessarily malicious). The underlying premise is that malicious
activities will deviate significantly from normal behavior. The characterization of normal be-
havior is called a normal profile which is usually constructed by statistical analysis of training
data obtained from observations of past normal behavior. A major advantage of anomaly de-
tection is the potential to detect new attacks without prior experience. At the same time, it
suffers from high false alarm rate.
In specification-based detection [72], the correct behaviors of critical objects are abstracted
and crafted as security specification, which are compared to the actual behavior of the objects.
Intrusions, which usually cause an object to behave in an incorrect manner, can be detected
without exact knowledge about the nature of the attacks.
Based on the network architecture, IDSs can be divided into two types. One type of intru-
sion detections falls into a single layer design which normally involves the information from
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the network layer. The other type of intrusion detection techniques involve cross layer de-
sign [49, 55, 69, 70, 85]. The behavior from multiple layers in the network stack have been
observed and analyzed for intrusion detection.
2.2.2 Single-layer Based Intrusion Detection Methods
Watchdog, introduced by Marti et al. [53] was the first snooping ID protocol for MANETs.
Watchdog relies upon Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [44] and each node participates by
“watching” its downstream node, on the route from source to desitnation, to ensure that it has
re-transmitted the packet without modification. The authors asserted hold that if source routing
is not used then a misbehaving node could simply broadcast to a non-existent node to fool the
watchdog. While this is true, packet modification is not covered up by simply broadcasting
to a non-existent node. To mitigate the effects of a misbehaving node, the authors introduce
Pathrater, which selects a path from source to destination based upon a “reliability” metric,
instead of the shortest path. This approach relieves the malicious node from the requirement
of participating in the routing process, which may be construed as a reward.
Buchegger and Le Boudec [28] build upon Marti et al.’s work by replacing Watchdog with
Neighborhood Watch, which is also dependent upon DSR, and snoops its downstream neigh-
bor. They introduce a Trust Manager, Reputation System, and a Path Manager. Essentially
each node is required to run a finite state machine to calculate trust, which in turn is used
to decide the other node’s reputation and then to determine routes with the highest security
metric.
Tseng et al. [72] present a specification based IDSs over the Ad hoc On-Demand Distance
Vector (AODV) routing protocol. The IDS is built on a distributed network monitor archi-
tecture that traces AODV request-reply flows. Network monitors audit every route request
(RREQ), route reply (RREP) and route error (RERR) in order to build and update complete
request-reply session trees and corresponding forwarding tables. Constraints on the request-
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reply flow are specified using finite state machines. Once the correct behaviors of AODV are
manually abstracted and crafted as security specifications, and this is compared with the ac-
tual behavior of the AODV. Intrusions, which usually cause object to behavior in an incorrect
manner, can be detected without exact knowledge about them.
Patwardhan et al. [56] propose an approach of securing a MANET using a threshold-based
intrusion detection and a secure routing protocol. In their work, a two-pronged approach for
protecting MANETs against attacks - secure the routing process and deploy IDSs on individual
nodes throughout the network to detect misbehaviors. The secure routing protocol is based on
IPv6 and the IDSs is based on “watchdog” mechanisms. That is, a common neighbor of two
nodes on a link will be selected to watch packet transmission. If packet dropping rate reaches
a certain threshold, an alarm will be triggered at the monitoring node.
2.2.3 Cross-layer Based Intrusion Detection Schemes
Zhang et al [85] propose the idea of multi-layer intrusion detection in wireless ad hoc
networks. They present a cooperative distributed intrusion detection and response framework
for MANET. Anomaly detection is the primary ID approach discussed, including anomalies
in routing updates, abnormalities at the MAC layer (number of channel requests, etc.)
[70] presents a cross-layer design for DoS attacks. Two different ways for cross layer
detection have been provided: CIDS-I in which detection information at one layer triggers
other layers detection in the protocol stack; CIDS-II includes a detection that is based on
information collected from different layers.
In [49], Liu et al. propose a node-based intrusion detection system (IDS) for wireless
ad hoc networks. They define a feature set that correlates information from MAC layer and
network layer to profile normal behaviors of mobile nodes, and they also adapt a rule-based
data mining technique for anomaly detection.
[69] utilizes cross layer information for jamming attacks detection in wireless ad hoc net-
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works. Specifically, they they provide a monitor based intrusion detection system for wireless
ad hoc networks. They model the jamming attacks at different layers of the protocol stack and
studied the effects of different jamming attacks on the network performance. A cross-layer ap-
proach is adopted to estimate the network congestion in order to reliably evaluate the presence
of jamming.
2.3 Intrusion Response in Multi-hop Wireless Networks
2.3.1 Introduction
Intrusion response is generally referred to a series of actions that can be deployed to thwart
attack and ensure the safety of computer systems. It is often integrated with IDS and triggered
when IDS has detected intrusion and raised the alarm. However, intrusion response has not
gained as much attention as intrusion detection in both industry and academia. In most existing
security systems, it highly relies on the expertise of system administrators to select or deploy
response actions. There is a need for IRS and IDS to cooperate and work in parallel as attackers
intervene in an automated way, at computer speed.
In wireless mesh networks, there are only a handful of research work [18, 75] that have
conducted in intrusion response. Unlike wired network, wireless mesh networks are more
vulnerable to malicious attacks, have distributed network architectures, and present dynamic
network topology. Those characteristics may require different response actions and strategies.
2.3.2 Existing Solutions for Intrusion Response
Stakhanova et al. [63] have provided a general overview of existing work in intrusion
response system. Based on triggered response activities, an IRS could be a passive system
which mainly generates notification and provides response information. On the contrary, an
active response system aims to minimize damage cost and trace attackers. Based on degree
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of automation, IRSs can be divided into notification system, manual response system, and
automatic system. Today, most of the research in IRS focus on automatic response systems.
Lee et al. [47] proposed a cost-sensitive model for intrusion detection and response. Three
cost factors are identifed: operational cost that covers the cost of processing and analyzing
data for detecting the intrusion, damage cost which measures the cost caused by the attack
and response cost that includes the operational cost deploying the response actions. The three
cost facts act as metrics for selecting intrusion response measures. Starting with a taxonomy
of attacks that have been given by a reference dataset, empirical costs for the attack damage
and reactions have been defined.
Toth and Kruegel [71] represents a network system in a dependency tree which models
the configuration of resources (network services provided by hosts), users, network topology,
and firewall rules. Different dependency relation between resources and users are shown in
the model. Once an intrusion is identified and a response action is added into the model, the
penalty cost caused by the response to the system is evaluated. The one with the least penalty
cost to the system is selected. The model is used to select a globally optimal response.
Balepin et al. [22] use a direct graph to model local resources and their dependencies.
Nodes in the graph represent specific resources in the system and edges represent dependen-
cies between them. The authors propose to use costs of priority resources as base metric for
response choice. In their system map, only priority nodes - representing the important system
resources - have a cost value of their own. Cost values are assigned to other nodes based
upon the fact, that priority nodes depend on them. The cost values are set by the network ad-
ministrator on creation of the system map. Subsequently, the following values are computed:
Intrusion Damage (sum of all cost values of the affected nodes), Response Benefit (sum of all
cost values of the nodes, that are restored to safe state by the response), and Response Costs
(sum of all cost values of the nodes, that are negatively affected by the response).
ADEPTS [81] is a more complex framework for determining automated responses against
attacks. In the framework, two types of graphs are used: a server graph (S-Graph) which rep-
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resents the inter-dependencies between services and an attack graph(I-Graph) which describes
the attack state and their possibilities. I-Graph is created based on S-Graph and later the attack
graph is used for response selection. The responses are selected based on the effectiveness of
this response to a particular attack in the past. To determine when to deploy the response
ADEPTS uses Compromised Confidence Index (CCI ) which expresses the probability that the
goal represented as a node in I-Graph is currently achieved by the attacker.
Jahnke et al. [43] generate a dependency graph for system resources in which nodes of the
graph represent resources and edges represent different types of dependencies among resource
entities. This dependency graph is used for both quantifying the effects of a response mea-
sure after its application and for choosing the most promising alternative of a set of available
response measures.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented background and related work in security research over
wireless mesh networks. Especially, we focused our literature review in group key manage-
ment, intrusion detection and intrusion response. In next chapters, we will introduce our new
schemes of a heterogeneous group key management, cross-layer based intrusion detection,
and a generic intrusion response model.
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CHAPTER 3. A HETEROGENEITY-AWARE FRAMEWORK OF
GROUP KEY MANAGEMENT IN WIRELESS MESH NETWORKS
3.1 Introduction
Group key management plays an essential role in securing multicast communication for
WMNs. The problem has been extensively studied for both wired and wireless networks,
which result in three typical categories of solutions [58]: centralized [29, 30, 73, 79], decen-
tralized [26, 35, 54, 59, 62], and distributed [45, 57] key updating protocols. The centralized
method relies on a trusted third party called group server to generate and distribute group
keys. With this method, the logic tree-based schemes proposed in [21, 74, 79] are representa-
tive. Although their communication, storage and computation cost is Θ(logn), where n is the
group size, the communication cost and the rekeying delay are still high when these schemes
are applied to a large scale network. The decentralized method distributes the group man-
agement duty to multiple subgroup leaders in order to reduce the load at a single point. In a
distributed key management scheme, there is no explicit group server, and keys are generated
collaboratively by one or multiple group members. Many group key management techniques
for wireless ad hoc networks and sensor networks fall into the third category. Particularly,
these schemes may take the threshold-based approach, in which the group key is either agreed
among group members or generated based on shares from group members [48, 51, 83].
However, none of existing solutions fits well in WMNs, since they cannot take advantage
of or mitigate the disadvantage of the architectural heterogeneity of WMNs. Unlike wire-
less ad hoc network or sensor networks which are solely composed of homogeneous wireless
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devices, WMNs are heterogeneous. In such networks, different types of networking compo-
nents are integrated which requires our security design to accommodate different requirements
and/or limitations. For instance, mesh routers and mesh clients have different power con-
straints: mesh clients usually have constrained power and energy supply while mesh routers
do not. In addition, conventional wireless networks provide a wired infrastructure and have
only the wireless connectivity at the last mile, WMNs provide a multi-hop wireless infrastruc-
ture which lacks physical protection. The nature of wireless communication within WMNs
makes it highly vulnerable to security attacks [15, 61]. Furthermore, the hierarchical network
structure of WMNs can be exploited to facilitate group key management. In [66], network
topology is leveraged in building the key tree over cellular network. However, this method
cannot be directly applied to WMNs since the topology considered by them has only one-hop
wireless communication.
We propose a novel heterogeneity-aware group key management framework which com-
bines the logical key hierarchical technique together with the localized threshold-based tech-
nique. Specifically, a WMN multicast session involves both static backbone nodes and mobile
client nodes: for backbone nodes which are topologically-stable but may spread over a large
area, the localized threshold-based group key management technique is applied since the tech-
nique requires stable network topology and its rekeying delay is independent of network scale;
for client nodes associated with each backbone node which are mobile but confined in a lim-
ited area, the logical key hierarchical technique is applied since the technique is resilient to
node mobility but its rekeying delay is proportional to the network scale. The contributions of
this work include, but not limited to:
• Advantages of heterogeneity of WMNs: Our framework take the advantage of hetero-
geneity of WMNs and divides the group key management into two layers. The top tier
includes all backbone nodes and adapts a threshold based group key agreement protocol
to update shared session keys. The bottom tier is composed of a backbone node and the
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associated group members. Each backbone node provides the subgroup leader capabil-
ity which includes building and maintaining a logical key hierarchy (LKH) [73, 79] for
corresponding group members.
• Localization of key refreshment: The key refreshing for both the top layer and bottom
layer happen at the local environment.
• Resilience to both insider attacks and outsider attacks: The property of the threshold-
based group key agreement protocol over the wireless mesh backbone ensure our frame-
work resilient to both insider attacks and outsider attacks.
• Reduction of rekeying delay and storage overhead at end nodes: Comparing with tradi-
tional LKH where a single key tree is built for the group and new keys have to be sent
by the group server, our framework localizes the key refreshing at the subgroup leader
and a single hop communication might be the only requirement for key updating. In
addition, the key tree at the mesh router can be much smaller. Therefore the number of
keys required for a group member can be much smaller.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the system model on which
our group key management is based. Section 3.3 overviews the heterogeneity-aware frame-
work, identifies technique problems in the integration and lists possible solutions. Section
3.4 presents a specific implementation of group key management system under our frame-
work. Section 3.5 provides analysis of security, communication load and other related issues.
Performance evaluation results are shown in section 3.6. Finally, section 3.7 concludes the
work.
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3.2 System Model
3.2.1 Trust Model
In our design, we assume that a group server is a trusted entity resident in the network and
it is responsible for group initialization and information collection from mesh routers. The
group server publishes its public key into the network and a subgroup leader can generate and
distribute keys. We also assume that a mesh router in a WMN can conduct authentication
activities. For instance, Zhang et al [84] provides a security architecture for wireless mesh
client and mesh routers to conduct mutual authentication. Based on those security mechanisms
we assume that the group server can trust the mesh routers during group initialization. We later
release this assumption in our scheme.
3.2.2 Attack Model
In this section, we divide attacks against the WMNs into two categories: outsider attacks
and insider attacks. Outsider attacks usually do not jeopardize the network. They commonly
do network monitoring and traffic analysis on the target network.Eavesdropping and traffic
analysis are typical outsider attacks. On the contrary, insider attacks directly target at breaking
down the networks. Router failure, message compromising and collusion attacks all belong to
this category. In the following, we list those attacks:
• Eavesdropping Eavesdropping attack is one type of outsider attacks. It occurs when
someone listens to or eavesdrops on network traffic. The eavesdropper can capture and
analyze message exchange in order to reveal the secret keys. Eavesdropping attacks are
by their very nature difficult to detect.
• Traffic analysis Another type of outsider attacks is traffic analysis. Unlike an eaves-
dropping attack, an adversary in traffic analysis may explore the vulnerability of cryp-
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tography method to crack the group keys. This type of attack is out of the scope of this
work.
• Router failure The purpose of this type of insider attack is to physically break down
systems in order to breach the network service. For instance, an attacker may crack
the system running on the router in order to make the broadband service unavailable
to clients. In other cases, an adversary can physically capture the node [67] and crack
the security information on the node. Those attacks will crash mesh routers in the mesh
network, thus fail the service provided to clients. A direct consequence of such an attack
is that those clients associated with the victim router will lose the connection. In order to
handle such an accident, redundancy or other security mechanisms have to be provided.
• Message compromising Message compromising is another type of insider attack as the
attacker intends to reveal secret information of the network and steal useful messages
or data from the network. By compromising the system running on a mesh router, an
intruder can infer secret keys and be able to decrypt the message shared only by group
members. In some situation, this attack is the extension of the router failure attacks.
For instance, an adversary can physically capture the node and crack the security in-
formation on the node. Then the adversary places the compromised node back on the
network and this node will resume all the responsibilities of a legal node. In such a way
the adversary will be able to get all useful information from the compromised node.
• Collusion attack Collusion attack is a type of insider attack that could happen among
several colluding mesh routers. Routers that are compromised can build secret tunnels
between one another and use them to exchange messages. Once enough information is
gathered, it can be used to crack the group keys of the network.
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3.3 A Heterogeneity-Aware Group Key Management Framework
We propose a complete framework for group key management in WMNs. The frame-
work takes advantage of the heterogeneity of WMN and applies both tree based hierarchical
techniques and threshold-based techniques.
In general, our framework divides the key management into two layers: bottom layer and
top layer. The bottom layer includes a set of subgroups. Each subgroup is composed of a mesh
router and a set of group members associated with it. The mesh router will act as the subgroup
leader. In each subgroup, the subgroup leader builds and maintains a logical hierarchical key
tree for its associated members. A client joins/leaves the group through the subgroup leader
which is responsible for membership verification and key updating. A mesh router becomes
a subgroup leader after it is authenticated by the group server. The root key of the key tree at
the subgroup is called sub-key.
At the top layer, all subgroup leaders form a wireless ad hoc network where a threshold-
based key management technique will be applied. We do not restrict any particular technique
at this point as many can be adopted. For instance, Asokan et al in [19] proposed a password-
based multi-party Diffie-Hellman group key agreement protocol which is mainly for a physi-
cally presented group that shares a password, e.g. groups in a meeting room or a classroom.
Some other threshold-based group key management protocols allows group members to com-
pute the group key based on their individual contributions providing verifiable trust relation-
ship between participants [48, 51, 83]. In our framework implementation, the threshold-based
group key management in [83] is applied. We call the shared key among subgroup leaders a
session-key. This session key is also held by the group server.
In the following, section 3.3.1 presents a multicast session in a WMN. Section 3.3.2 de-
scribes subgroup leader initialization. The rekeying process for a group member join/leave is
shown in section 3.3.3, and section 3.3.4 discusses revocation of a subgroup leader.
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3.3.1 A Multicast Session in WMN
Our framework supports both one-to-many and many-to-many [42] group communication.
In one-to-many group communication, the message flows from the group server to group
members; while in many-to-many group communication, each member can be both sender
and receiver.
We first describe the process involved in a one-to-many multicast session: the message
will be first encrypted using the shared session-key on the top layer, then be disseminated to
the network. Once a subgroup leader receives the message, it first decrypts the message and
then encrypts the message using the sub-key shared by all subgroup members in the bottom
layer. After that, the message is broadcast by the leader. All clients in the transmission range
may receive the message. But only those clients that have joined the group will be able to
decrypt the message. The process is also shown in Fig. 4.1:
(a) GS → SLi: Kt{M}, i = 1, ..., n
(b) SLi: K−1t {Kt{M}}
(c) SLi → GMij : Kb{M}, j = 1, ...,m
(d) GMij : K−1b {Kb{M}}
Here GS is the group server, M represents the message, SLi (i = 1, ..., n) is the ith subgroup
leader, GMij (j = 1, ...,m) is the jth group member of SLi, and Kt and Kb denote top layer
session-key and bottom layer sub-key, respectively.
In many-to-many group communication, group members can share messages among one
another. In this case, a group member is the sender and other group members are receivers.
The sender first encrypts the message using the subgroup key sub-key and sends it to the
corresponding subgroup leader. The subgroup leader then is required to process the message
such that its associated group members can receive it and group members associated with
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other subgroups can also receive it. To accomplish the first goal, the subgroup leader simply
rebroadcast the message to its own subgroup. Then the subgroup leader decrypts the mes-
sage and encrypts it using the top layer session-key and broadcasts it to backbone. Other
subgroup leaders conduct the same process as in one-to-many multicast session. After that,
the encrypted message will be distributed to the associated group members. A many-to-many
multicast session is shown in Fig 4.1:
(1) GMij → SLi: Kb{M}
(2) SLi → GMik : Kb{M}, k = 1, ...,m
(3) GMik : K−1b {Kb{M}}, k 6= j
(4) SLj: K−1b {Kb{M}}, k 6= j
(5) SLj → SLl: Kt{M}, l 6= j
(6) SLl: K−1t {Kt{M}}
(7) SLl → GMlj : Kb{M}, j = 1, ...,m
(8) GMlj : K−1b {Kb{M}}
3.3.2 Initialization of Subgroup Leaders
In the previous section, we do not differentiate subgroup leaders and mesh routers as we
assume that each mesh router acts as a subgroup leader. However, a mesh router may not have
any member nodes connected to it. In this case, including mesh nodes that do not participate
in the group is not necessary. We can add a mesh router into the group when there is a demand.
We call the latter method reactive initialization and the former one proactive initialization.
Proactive initialization configures all mesh nodes in a WMN as subgroup leaders during
group initialization. In this method a new node can join the group without any delay. The
drawback is that session-key is widely spread and is more likely to get compromised.
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Figure 3.1 WMN multicast session (GS: group server, GM: group member, SL:
subgroup leader, one-to-many multicast: (a)-(d), many-to-many mul-
ticast: (1)-(8))
In a reactive method, a mesh router is initialized as a subgroup leader when its first sub-
group member joins the group. It has the drawback of delaying a new member’s join as it has
to yield the corresponding mesh router to get initialized from the group server.
Another issue related to subgroup leader initialization is how to authenticate a group mem-
ber. A subgroup leader can forward such a join request to the group server and waits for a pos-
itive reply to add the member to its subgroup. In this case, the group server will be frequently
invoked during the group communication. A more efficient way is to involve subgroup leaders
in membership verification. However, subgroup leaders can not be fully trusted by a group
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member as they could get compromised. In 3.4.1.1 we propose a Bloom Filter [25] based
authentication method to allow a subgroup leader to verify a client’s membership without any
complementary secure information.
3.3.3 Join/Leave of a Group Member
In a WMN, a group member may join or leave the group at any time. To ensure forward
security, when a group member leaves, the related subgroup leader deletes corresponding key
information from the key tree and updates sub-key as well as related key encryption keys
(KEKs) [74] held by this departing node.
Similarly, backward security has to be ensured for a join request from a group member.
The associated subgroup leader generates a shared key for a new member and inserts it into
the key tree as a leaf node. Then all corresponding KEKs from the leave node to the root node
will be updated and sent to the new node.
A join/leave request can also be generated during node mobility. When a group member
moves from place to place, its subgroup membership will may changed. In order to continue an
on-going multicast session, a mobile member needs to join the new subgroup. In addition, as
it leaves the old subgroup, key refreshment has to be invoked in the old subgroup. A mobility
management scheme in will be provided in section 3.4.4 to ensure seamless handover in our
framework.
3.3.4 Revocation of a Subgroup Leader
A subgroup leader will be revoked if it is detected behaving maliciously. The first step for
the revocation at every other subgroup is to reset timer and launch the session-key updating
process. We assume a backup router is installed or coverage redundancy is provided in the
wireless mesh backbone. A backup router replicates the original mesh node. Therefore, the
switch will be transparent to a client. For coverage redundancy, a client node is covered by at
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least two mesh routers. Then the neighbor nodes of the revoked subgroup leader will send out
messages to notify those group members. A group member can respond to such a message to
join a new subgroup.
3.4 A Heterogeneity-Aware Group Key (HAGK) Management Scheme
In the above section, we have presented a heterogeneity-aware framework for group key
management in WMNs. In this section, we introduce a specific group key management scheme
to implement the framework, namely, a heterogeneity-aware group key (HAGK) management
scheme. In this scheme, two techniques are adopted into the framework: the threshold-based
group key management in [83] is applied to the top layer and the traditional logical key hier-
archy (LKH) [79] is used in the bottom layer.
The HAGK key management scheme includes three components: group initialization,
threshold-based key agreement protocol and logical key hierarchy. We describe each com-
ponent in the following.
3.4.1 Group Initialization
During group initialization, subgroup leaders are configured appropriately such that they
can authenticate a group member. They are also loaded with necessary information for the
upper layer threshold-based group key management. These two tasks are completed during
subgroup leader initialization and key pre-distribution.
3.4.1.1 Subgroup Leader Initialization
In our framework, a subgroup leader participates the top layer group key agreement and
is also responsible for maintaining a key tree for connected members. In addition, it is able
to verify a client’s membership. In the following, we propose a Bloom Filter [25] based
authentication method, called semi-anonymity authentication, to allow group members to get
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authenticated without revealing their secure information to a subgroup leader. It is semi-
anonymous as the subgroup leader requires the identification of a group member. To ease
description, we assume a proactive initialization is used. We will explain how this method can
be extended to reactive initialization in section 3.4.5.
Bloom Filter Bloom filter is widely used for membership query. A Bloom filter represents
n elements in a set B = b1, b2, ..., bn. It includes a vector v of m bits, initially all set to 0, and
k hash functions h1, h2, ...hk, each with hash value in 1, ...m. For each element b ∈ B, the
bits at position h1(b), h2(b), ..., hk(b) in v will be set to 1. Given a membership query for c, if
any of the bits at h1(c), h2(c), ..., hk(c) is 0, then certainly c is not in the set B. Otherwise, we
conjecture that c is in the set. However, there is a certain probability of false positive.
The salient feature of Bloom filter is that there is a clear tradeoff between m and the
probability of a false positive. Observer that after n keys into a table of size m, the probability
that a particular bit is still 0 is exactly
(1− ( 1
m
))kn
. Hence the probability of a false positive in the situation is
(1− (1− ( 1
m
))kn)k ≈ (1− e knm )k
The right hand is minimized for k = ln 2×m/n, in which case it becomes
(
1
2
)k = (0.6185)m/n
.
The subgroup leader initialization includes the following steps:
1. Each client is required to register with the group server before the group communication
starts. The group server will generate a unique ticket for each client. A ticket can be the
hash value over user identification and password or a type of certificate.
GS → GMi : Ti, i ∈ 1, ..., n
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Where Ti is the ticket for GMi.
2. The group server stores each ticket in its storage and generates a Bloom Filter for all
tickets Ti, i ∈ 1, ..., n.
GS : generate BF
3. Before the group communication starts, the group server broadcast the Bloom Filter BF
to the network. To ensure authenticity, the group server can encrypt BF using its private
key.
GS → SLj : kps{BF}
where kps is the private key of the group server.
4. Upon receiving the Bloom Filter BF from the group server, a mesh node decrypts it
using the group server’s public key. Then the mesh nodes generates a secret key ki and
sends ki to the group server together with its identification.
SLi → GS : kpb{id, ki}
kpb is the public key of the group server
When a registered group member wants to join the group communication, it sends its
identification together with its ticket Ti to the associated mesh node. Upon receiving Ti, the
subgroup leader verifies its membership based on the saved Bloom Filter.
In the above authentication method, a malicious mesh router could change the Bloom Filter
it saved to disallow a legitimate member node and generates any ticket for a malicious client.
We will address this issue in section 3.5.3.
For a group with n group members, m and k have to be selected in the Bloom Filter gener-
ation to ensure low false positive rate and also low communication overhead. For instance, in
a large group with 1024 nodes, if we want to ensure a false positive rate of 0.01, m can be set
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to 10, 240 with k = 5. A lower false positive rate of 0.001 can be ensured if m is set to 15, 360
bits and k = 8. In both cases, the size of m is about 2 packet size if each packet is 1000 bytes.
false positive rate k m (bits)
0.01 5 10,240
0.001 8 15,360
3.4.1.2 Key-predistribution
At the end of subgroup leader initialization, each mesh router will share a session key ki
with the group server. Then the group server will use this session key for key-predistribution
as specified in [83].
The group server constructs a t-degree (t is a system parameter) univariate polynomial
p(x) over a prime finite field F (q) to represent the keys of the group, where p(0) is the initial
group key, p(c) (c ≥ 1) is the group key of version c, and q is a large prime whose size can
accommodate a group key. The group server then sends out the group polynomial p(x) to
every mesh router in the wireless mesh network using the received secure key.
Upon receiving the group polynomial p(x), every mesh router u will
• randomly pick up a polynomial, called encryption polynomial, to encrypt the group
polynomial p(x). The encrypted group polynomial is p′(x);
• calculate a share for each member in its neighbor list using the encryption polynomial;
• send out the share to each corresponding neighbor and delete the original group polyno-
mial p(x).
The encryption polynomial is a bivariate polynomial. For instance, the randomly-picked
encryption polynomial at mesh router u is as follows:
ru(x, y) =
∑
0≤i≤t,0≤j≤µ
Ai,jx
iyj,
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where t and µ are system parameters that can be adjusted to satisfy the requirement of the
security mechanism.
Using the encryption polynomial ru(x, y), the mesh router u encrypts the group polyno-
mial p(x):
p′(x) = p(x) + ru(x, u)
We assume each router u maintains a neighbor list that includes all the one-hop neighbors
and two-hop neighbors.
In this paper, we will use neighbor and one-hop neighbor interchangeably and we will
specify two-hop neighbor when needed. The major purpose to maintain two level neighbor-
hood information at each router is to get enough neighbors to satisfy the security requirement
of the system which will be explained in section 3.5.
After the group polynomial encryption, mesh router u distributes a share of ru(x, y) to
each member in its neighbor list. Specifically, every member vi in the neighbor list gets a
share of ru(x, vi). At the same time, u removes the encryption polynomial ru(x, y) and the
group polynomial p(x), but keeps p′(x) and the initial group key p(0).
3.4.2 Threshold-based Key Agreement Protocol
Within the wireless mesh backbone of wireless mesh network, a threshold based key agree-
ment protocol [83] is employed to periodically update the session key shared by all subgroup
leaders.
Each subgroup leader maintains a rekeying timer, which is used to periodically notify the
subgroup leader to update its group key, and the current version of the group key (denoted as
c). Note that c is initialized to 0 when the group server initializes the group setting.
To update group keys, each mesh router u increases the value of c by one, and returns
share rvi(c, u) to mesh router vi. vi could be either u’s one-hop neighbor or two-hop neigh-
bor. Meanwhile, router u receives a share ru(c, vi) from mesh router vi. Having received µ+1
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shares from its neighbors and two-hop neighbors, which can be denoted as< vi, ru(c, vi) >, i = 0, ..., µ,
router u can reconstruct a unique µ-degree polynomial
ru(c, y) =
µ∑
j=0
Bjy
j
by solving the following µ+ 1 (µ+ 1)-variable linear equations:
µ∑
j=0
(vi)
jBj = ru(c, vi), i = 0, ..., µ.
By knowing ru(c, x), router u can compute its new group key p(c) = p′(c)− ru(c, u).
3.4.3 Hierarchical Key Tree
Each mesh router acts as a subgroup leader which builds and maintains a key tree for all
associated group members. Upon receiving a join request from a new member, the mesh router
does not forward the join request to the group server as it does in a traditional hierarchical
key tree management. Instead, it generates a pairwise key for the new client and returns the
corresponding KEKs in the key tree to the new client. Similarly, when a member leaves (or
is evicted from) the group, the subgroup leader will update all the keys held by the departing
member. That is, all the KEKs in the path from the parent of the departing member to the root
will be regenerated and distributed into the local client network. More detailed operations of
member join/leave can be found in [74] and [79].
Meanwhile, the router keeps a record of its group members which may include the member
id number, joining time, and departing time. All the information will be periodically reported
to the group server to maintain the log.
3.4.4 Mobility Management
During a group communication over a WMN, great care must be taken to ensure seamless
handover when a group member moves from place to place and its subgroup gets changed.
Our framework provides a simple algorithm mobility management.
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We use an example to show the mobility management in our scheme. In Fig. 3.2 a group
member GM moves from placeA to placeB, to placeC, and to placeD in which it, respec-
tively, associated with mesh router 3, 5, 6 and 9. GM leaves the group at placeD where it is as-
sociated with mesh node 9. We denote the subgroup at each mesh router as SGi (i = 1, ..., 9).
The steps involved in mobility management are stated as follows.
1. GM initially belongs to SG3. When GM is about to handover from SG3 to SG5, it
sends SG3 a “roam” message together with a random number r. Then SG3 issues a
transfer ticket: h(GM, ks, r) to GM where GM represents the member id, ks is the
current session − key in the top layer. At the same time, SG3 broadcast a message
to its neighbors (e.g. SG1, SG2, SG4 and SG5) with the id of the roaming group
member. SG3 then inserts the id of GM into its roam list which includes the ids of
group members that roamed out of this subgroup. Note that the old subgroup leader
SG3 does not unicast the message as it does not know to which neighbor the group
member is moving to.
2. From the first step, SG1, SG2, SG4 and SG5 cache GM ’s id in a list called waiting list.
Once GM selects to join the subgroup SG5, it sends its identification and the random
number r to SG5. SG5 checks its waiting list and gets to know that GM comes from
subgroup SG3. SG5 then replies with a hash value h(GM, ks, r) and the corresponding
keys from the key tree to GM as if a new group member joins the subgroup. Upon
receiving the reply from SG5, GM verifies the received value from SG5 equal to its
transfer ticket, which shows that SG5 is still an active subgroup leader in the group
communication. GM then accepts keys from SG5. Otherwise, it selects another sub-
group leader. Once SG5 gets verified, GM replies SG5 an “accept” message. SG5 then
caches a reverse path to SG3 in its roaming list. Other neighbors will delete the id from
its waiting list if no association is received after a certain time.
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3. When GM leaves SG5 and joins SG6, SG5 will act the same way as SG3 and SG6 will
conduct all the actions in the second step. So does the handover between SG6 and SG9.
4. Eventually, a group member will leave the group. As in the example, GM leaves the
group from SG9. SG9 will first update its key tree after GM sends the leaving request.
Then SG9 will check its roaming list and sends a “Roaming Member Leave” message
to SG6 according to the reverse path.
5. Upon receiving “Roaming Member Leave” message, SG6 deletes GM from its roam-
ing list and updates its key tree as if a group member leaves the subgroup. Similar to
SG9, SG6 forwards the message to SG5, then SG5 to SG3.
6. SG3 updates its roaming list and key tree accordingly. No message will be sent out
from SG3 as SG3 is the last hop along the reverse path.
Figure 3.2 Mobility management of group key management in WMNs
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3.4.5 Reactive Initialization
The threshold based group key agreement protocol requires each subgroup leader has a
certain number of neighbors. Under this condition, proactive method is more appropriate. If
reactive method is applied, we allow those subgroup leaders to establish an overlay network
above the wireless mesh backbone. And for a small size of overlay, our threshold based key
agreement protocol degrade to Diffie-Hellman method where all subgroup leaders contribute
to agree on a session-key.
3.5 Discussion
3.5.1 Security Analysis
In section 3.2.2, several attacks in WMNs have been described. In the following, we’ll
show that our HAGk group key management is resilient to those attacks or makes them hard.
Outsider attacks won’t be useful in revealing the two shared keys: session-key and sub-
key, in HAGK group key management. For instance, for an attack that aims to infer the group
key polynomial at the top layer, the attacker needs to monitor several links at the same time.
It is first required to get ru(c, vi) which is encrypted using the secret key shared between
backbone nodes u and vi. Even (µ + 1) such shares are retrieved, the passive attack still can
not infer the original group key polynomial p(x) as p′(x) is unknown which is kept by the
backbone node and is never been transmitted in the network.
When a new backbone is added into the network, p(x) is transmitted to the new subgroup
leader. An adversary may monitor the traffic in the network at this time in order to get p(x).
As the network topology of WMNs is relative stable, the chance that a new added backbone
will also join an on-going group communication is rare.
For the router failure attack, if the wireless infrastructure provides such a redundancy for
the client network, then the problem is solved. With the redundancy deployment, each area
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is cover by at least two backbone nodes. If one fails, the other one can be used. Those
disconnected group members can rejoin the group though the other backbone node. If no re-
dundancy is guaranteed at the wireless infrastructure, the group server or the neighbor node
for the cracked backbone node will cache missed messages for group members that are dis-
connected from the group. When they get back to the group later, the cached message will be
resent to the subgroup.
The HAGk group key management is resilient to collusion attacks up to size of µ+1. This
is decided by the threshold-based key updating protocol at the top layer. A new session key is
calculated at each subgroup leader based on the µ+1 contributions from its one-hop and two-
hop neighbors. According to [83], the group polynomial p(x) of group g is compromised if
and only if (1) a subgroup leader u is compromised and (2) at least µ+1 neighbors (including
two-hop neighbors) of u are compromised or at least t + 1 past session keys of the group are
compromised. Therefore, our group key management is immune to collusion attack of size up
to µ. The detailed proof of these properties can be found in [83].
For message compromising attack, an hacker can compromise one mesh router in order
to obtain group polynomial p(x) that can generate all the session-keys shared by all mesh
routers. Physical capture attack may only reveal p′(x) on the node because p(x) is not saved.
Then an attacker can adopt other hacking methods to compromise the system on the router.
The hacker needs to be able to get ru(c, vi) before cracking the group key. This process might
be risky as deviated behaviors could be observed by an intrusion detection system deployed in
the network.
3.5.2 Communication Overhead
We further analyze the communication overhead caused by the threshold based group key
agreement protocol within subgroup leaders. In each session key refreshing cycle, every sub-
group leader is required to calculate and send out a share to each of its one-hop neighbors
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and two-hop neighbors. We assume the degree of each mesh router is d, then the communi-
cation has the complexity of O(d2). The worst case is when the backbone is fully connected,
d = n, where n is the number of mesh routers. To reduce the communication load for each
mesh router, an optimization mechanism can be applied. That is, the rekeying message can
be piggybacked with the routing messages. For instance, some routing protocols requires
a periodical exchange of neighborhood information. We can set the session key refreshing
timer equal to the exchange timer in the routing protocol, then the shares that are used for key
updating can be combined with the exchanging messages.
3.5.3 Other Issues
In the proposed scheme, we do not specify whether a group member is directly connected
to the wireless mesh network or is connected through a client network. Our method can be
applied in both situations. In the latter situation, two cases will be involved. In one case all
clients in the client network is included in the multicast group. Then the node that bridges the
client network and the mesh router can be treated as a single ”member” in the subgroup. Once
the message reaches the bridging node the message will be distributed following the group
communication mechanisms agreed within the local client network. In the other case, not all
clients in the client network join the group. The corresponding subgroup leader will treat each
client as if it is connected to the mesh network directly.
Furthermore, our method assumes that during the predeployment process the mesh routers
can be trusted. They will cooperatively discard the polynomial after the initialization. It is
possible that the mesh router has already been compromised before the group initialization
starts. If that happens, our predeployment procedure will fail. To ensure the trustworthiness,
the group server can rely on other security mechanisms to ensure the security of initialization
process. For instance, Zhang et al. [84] proposed an authentication and key agreement to
ensure mutual authentication between clients and mesh routers. Another method is to require
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every subgroup leader to get authenticated from the group server in a timely-based order [46].
3.6 Performance Evaluation
We analyze the storage overhead at an end node in HAGK in section 3.6.1, then show the
simulation results for rekeying delay and communication cost in section 3.6.2.
3.6.1 Analysis of Storage Overhead
Comparing to a global logical key tree built for the entire group, HAGK has much smaller
local key trees. We assume the group size is n and the number of subgroups is g. For a uniform
distribution each subgroup will have n/g group members and the height of a local key tree is
logn/g. Hence each end node only needs to store (1 + logn/g) keys. On the contrary, for a
centralized LKH method, 1 + logn keys are required for each end node. We plot the storage
overhead over the number of subgroups in Fig 3.3 when n is equal to 1024.
We observe that only around half of the keys will be stored for an end node in an medium
size WMN with 20 to 50 mesh nodes. As the network size increases, even fewer keys are
required. However, in the LKH scheme, the number of keys at an end node is decided by the
group size. Therefore, HAGK is more suitable for multicast with a large group over a large
network.
3.6.2 Simulation
We use ns2 [5] to perform our experiments. In the simulation, each node represents a
mesh router and they remain static throughout the simulations. We simulate the inter arrival
time and the average staying time for each member as exponential distribution processes [17].
The parameters we simulated are listed in Table 3.1. For instance, the number of subgroups g
ranges from 2 to 100 and the maximum number of each subgroup is set to 1000. The average
staying time for each member is set to 30 seconds and the average interval value λ changes
49
0 20 40 60 80 100
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Number of subgroups
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
k
e
y
s
 a
t 
a
n
 e
n
d
 n
o
d
e HAGK
LKH
Figure 3.3 Comparison of storage overhead
from 0.1 seconds to 20 seconds. The period for updating the upper layer session-key is set to
10 seconds and the simulation time is set to 1000 seconds.
In the experiments, we compared the performance of HAGK with traditional key tree
hierarchy in terms of two criteria:
• rekeying delay: Average time required from a key refreshing request is sent to the time
when corresponding keys are updated.
• communication cost: average number of messages sent by a node in rekeying when a
membership changes.
3.6.2.1 Rekeying Delay
In Fig. 3.4 we plot the average rekeying delay over the network size g. As the results for
different network settings are similar, we only show the results when the interval is set to 4.0
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Table 3.1 List of simulation parameters of cross-layer based IDS
Parameter Role
group size number of group members
g number of subgroups
λ average inter-arrival
γ average staying time
ρ period for key refreshment
T Simulation Time
seconds.
We observe that for both HAGK and traditional LKH group key management the rekeying
delay increases as the network size increases. Mathematically, the average delay is very close
to a linear function over the network size. However, the increase factor is different. For
instance, for a small mesh network with only two or four mesh routers, the rekeying delay
for both methods is less than 0.1 seconds. When the network becomes larger (with 100 mesh
routers), the average time for key refreshing in HAGK is 0.5 seconds, which is only 1
13
of the
time required for rekeying in LKH group key management.
This is due to the fact that key refreshing in HAGK is localized at the subgroup leaders.
Most of key updating only requires communication within one hop when the client is within
the transmission range of the associated mesh router. On the contrary, a longer delay is caused
in traditional LKH due to the reason that a join request or a leave request may traverse multiple
wireless links to reach a group server.
Fig. 3.5 shows how the average rekeying delay is affected by requesting frequencies in
different network settings. The average inter arrival time ranges from 0.1s to 20s and the
network size n varies from 4 to 100.
Observing the rekeying delay for HAGK shown in 3.5(a), we notice that the average rekey-
ing delay decreases when fewer key updating requests are generated. For example, for a mid-
dle size subgroup with 36 group members, the average time to get key refreshed is more than
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Figure 3.4 Average rekeying delay (interval = 4.0)
0.2 seconds when there are average 10 join requests or leave requests per second. If only
5 requests within 100 seconds are generated the delay decreases to 10 miniseconds. This is
due to the fact that clients share the medium in the communication with the subgroup leader.
Frequent join/leave events eventually cause interferences during the communication. Pack-
ets could get dropped and require retransmission. In addition, join/leave requests could get
queued up at a subgroup leader.
In our simulation, when a large network is involved, a large group is also created. For
instance, when n = 100 each subgroup will have maximum 100 members. As a result, the
rekeying delay increases as more members are requesting the service at each subgroup.
We observe similar performance for traditional LKH in 3.5(b). Like HAGK, the average
rekeying time decreases as inter arrival time increases which generates frequent join/departure
events. However, for the same network setting a group member has to wait longer time to join
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a group using traditional LKH than join one using HAGK.
3.6.2.2 Communication Cost
We examine communication cost over the backbone node involved in key refreshment for
HAGK. Each message could include several keys in our simulation. The average number of
messages sent by a mesh node in one second is plotted over interval in Fig. 3.6 and Fig. 3.7.
Fig. 3.6 compares the communication cost of HAGK to traditional LKH. For both LKH
and HAGK, when interval increases, which implies less frequently a rekeying request will
be sent, the communication cost decreases. Comparing to LKH, our group key framework
incurs more communication overhead within the backbone due to the periodical key updating
involved for the top layer key management. However, for a group in which the frequency of
incoming rekeying requests is in medium level (interval = 10 or interval = 20) only two
more messages are required for a mesh node.
In Fig. 3.7, we measure the distribution of communication cost in HAGK. The cost in-
volved for the top layer key management and bottom layer key management are plotted. The
results show that the cost caused by the periodical upper layer key updating is constant no
matter how frequent the membership changes.
We further measure the communication cost over the number of subgroups in the group
key management. For different network topology, the group size remains the same and the
number of subgroups is equal to the number of mesh nodes in a WMN. The results for both
LKH and HAGK are shown in Fig. 3.8. Notice that the communication cost in HAGK is
relatively independent on the size of the network. This is due to the fact that the threshold-
based key agreement relies on a localized neighborhood communication and the rekeying
requests from member nodes are handled by each subgroup leader. For LKH, as the size
of the WMN increases (subgroups increases), the communication cost increases in that key
updating messages may broadcast to the whole backbone. The communication cost tends to
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be stable after the network size reaches 100 as group size.
In summary, we observe that our heterogeneity-aware group key management scheme re-
duces rekeying delay and achieves low storage overhead at end nodes with minimum commu-
nication cost within backbone nodes.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a heterogeneity-aware group key management framework
which combines the logical key hierarchical technique together with distributed threshold-
based techniques in WMNs. We also developed a specific implementation of the group key
management framework which addresses the techniques involved in integrating the two differ-
ent key management schemes. Among them, we provide a Bloom Filter based authentication
method and a solution to management member node mobility. The followed analysis and sim-
ulation results verify that the proposed method reduces rekeying delay and storage overhead
at end nodes with minimum communication cost at backbone nodes. Further, the framework
is resilient to both insider and outsider attacks.
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CHAPTER 4. CROSS-LAYER DESIGN OF INTRUSION
DETECTION IN WIRELESS MESH NETWORKS
4.1 Motivation
Wireless mesh networking has been a cost-effective technology that provides wide-coverage
broadband wireless network services. They benefit both service providers with low cost in
network deployment, and end users with ubiquitous access to the Internet from anywhere at
anytime. However, as wireless mesh network (WMN) proliferates, security and privacy issues
associated with this communication paradigm become more and more evident and thus need
to be addressed.
Recently, a few key management schemes have been proposed to ensure secure commu-
nication over WMNs. For instance, Zhang et al [84] proposed an attack resilient security
architecture for wireless mesh network. Wang et al [76] provides a heterogeneity-aware group
key management framework to secure group communication over WMNs. However, utilizing
protection and encryption software to protect WMNs are not sufficient and effective, intrusion
detection systems need to be deployed to provide a second defense line [85] in such an open
environment. We address this problem by designing a cross-layer based anomaly intrusion
detection scheme in WMNs. WMN provides more diversified capabilities than mobile ad hoc
network (MANET). Its special network architecture and characteristics requires new design
in intrusion detection. A WMN is composed of a wireless infrastructure and associated client
networks. The wireless infrastructure, normally called wireless mesh backbone, contains a set
of mesh nodes (or mesh routers) which could be either static or dynamic and self-form a multi-
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hop wireless ad hoc network to relay data from client networks. Various wireless networks,
such as wireless ad hoc networks, sensor networks, and WiFi networks, can be integrated to
the backbone through the routing and gateway functionalities provided by mesh routers. Due
to its open medium, lack of traffic aggregation point, and dynamic topology, WMNs are vul-
nerable to all attacks that occur in MANETs. However, the mechanisms used in MANETs for
intrusion detection is not suitable for WMNs. Mesh nodes are usually equipped with multi-
ple radios. Thus, multiple channels are assigned at each node to support simultaneous data
transmission and reception [16, 60]. The integration of various types of wireless networks
also requires heterogeneity awareness design in intrusion detection. Further, new challenges
are presented in network protocols which integrates link information in routing selection to
improve the performance of multi-hop wireless transmission [37].
Many new routing metrics such as Expected Transmission Number (ETX) [34] and Ex-
pected Transmission Time (ETT) [37] utilize link quality as the route selection criteria. Due
to the high loss rate of wireless links, the new criteria require route selection should be based
on link quality instead of solely on hop count. In many cases, the least hop count path may
not achieve the best transmission performance. Link quality is normally quantified by band-
width, loss rate, etc.. In this case, routing protocol is closely correlated with data link layer. In
order to accurately catch features when attach happens, cross-layer design can be utilized in
intrusion detection over wireless mesh networks. That is, both data link and routing behaviors
will be monitored in detecting attacks. Cross layer has long been proposed to optimize the
performance and security of network [31] [15]. Network researchers and designers also con-
sider cross layer design for new network protocol stack. Intrusion detection system utilizing
cross-layer design are summarized in the related work section of this article.
Currently, research of wireless mesh network is still in its infancy and most of the existing
wireless mesh networks are built as testbed or only used for experimental purpose. The lack
of practical attacking data and cases requires that our intrusion detection design to be able to
accommodate new and novel attacks in WMNs. In this project, we propose to use anomaly
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intrusion detection system. Our design goals for such system include the following:
• Increase detection rate by correlating information from multiple layers in the protocol
stack;
• Reduce false alarm rate of anomaly intrusion detection using features from MAC layer
and network layer;
• Detect cross layer attack targeting different layers in the protocol stack.
Several research effort in cross-layer based intrusion detection design [49,55,69,70] have
shown that cross-layer based intrusion detection method outperforms single-layer (e.g. net-
work layer based) based intrusion detection method. However, none of those have been in-
vestigated in the WMN environment. In addition, no practical intrusion detection system has
been designed and implemented in WMNs.
In this work, we fill the gap by presenting a cross-layer based anomaly detection model
which utilizing machine learning algorithms for profile training and intrusion detection. Sta-
tistical features from both network layer and data link layer are collected and processed. We
have implemented the anomaly detection model on a WMN testbed. Experimental results
have shown that cross-layer based method has higher detection rate and lower false alarm rate
on the average, comparing to single-layer (e.g. network layer) intrusion detection.
Our contributions lie in the following three aspects:
1. Propose a cross-layer design of anomaly intrusion detection system which exploits the
correlation of routing protocols and data link layer in multihop wireless mesh network
environment.
2. Design and implement an anomaly based intrusion detection prototype in a wireless
mesh network testbed equipped with Microsoft Wireless Mesh Network Toolkit.
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3. Evaluate the cross-layer intrusion detection system by comparing its performance with
that of a single-layer based intrusion detection system with features only from net-
work layer. Experimental results have validated the effectiveness of cross-layer based
anomaly detection methods.
The rest of the chaper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides backgrounds for our
intrusion detection model. Section 4.3 presents the cross layer detection model and section 4.4
describes the anomaly intrusion detection approach. Section 4.5 introduces the testbed and the
intrusion detection software prototype. Section 4.5.3 shows the experimental results. Finally,
in section 4.6 we present some conclusions.
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Figure 4.1 Detection model
4.2 Quality Based Routing Metrics
The shortcomings of hop count based routing in multi-hop wireless networks have been
recognized in many research efforts ( [20, 32, 38–40, 80]). To improve performance of wire-
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Table 4.1 Threats in wireless mesh networks
Layer Threats
Physical Layer jamming, scrambling
MAC Layer identity theft, rogue mesh node attack, DoS attack, eaves-
dropping of management messages, management message
modification
Network Layer routing service disruption, traffic pattern distortion
Table 4.2 Feature selection for cross-layer based intrusion detection
Network
Layers
Parameters Statistic Measures Sampling
periods
Physical Channel switching Average and
5 second
Layer frequency Deviation
Data Bandwidth, Link loss rate Average and
Link and other link metrics Deviation
Network
Traffic related
Data packet Received, Sent
Layer Route Request Forwarded, Dropped;
Route Reply Average and Deviation
Route Error
Link cache re-
lated
Link added, modi-
fied; Route changed
Average and Deviation
less communication in multi-hop environment, new routing metrics have been proposed. Two
typical ones include ETX (Expected Transmission Count) [34] and ETT (expected transmis-
sion time) [37]. Both metrics measure the quality of links. The ETX metric measures link
quality using expected number of transmissions, including retransmissions, needed to send a
unicast packet across a link. ETT measures the expected transmission time of a packet on a
link. Further, Drave et al [37] calculate path metric WCETT (Weighted Cumulative Expected
Transmission Time) based on ETT by taking into consideration of channel diversity.
MR-LQSR routing protocol is a LQSR protocol with WCETT as routing selection metric.
It is a source-based link-state protocol derived from (Dynamic Source Routing) DSR [27] and
maintaining properties in link-state routing protocols. For instance, it includes components of
neighbor discovery and link information propagation which are similar to corresponding com-
ponents in link-state routing protocols and modules of route discovery and source route which
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it shares with DSR. More details about calculation of ETT, WCETT, and the implementation
of MR-LQSR can be found in [37].
4.3 Cross Layer Detection Model
The architecture of our cross layer intrusion detection is illustrated in Figure 4.1. This
model includes four components: Data collection module, profile training module, anomaly
detection module, and alert generation module. These four modules run on each mesh nodes
and collaboratively accomplish the goal of detecting anomaly behaviors in wireless mesh net-
work backbone.
The data collection module gathers audit data from local activities and network traffic
according to predefined features sets. In our cross layer design, the data collection module will
collect feature data sets from multiple layers which includes channel assignment and channel
switching frequency at physical layer, link information at data link layer, and routing activities
and data forwarding behavior at network layer. During data training phase, the collected
normal data set will be fed into the profile training module for a normal profile generation;
during anomaly detection phase, data collection module pipes data set into anomaly detection
module for intrusion detection.
Profile training module applies machine learning algorithms to train a normal profile at
each mesh node. Three different machine learning algorithms are utilized: Bayesian network,
decision tree, and support vector machine (SVM). Those three algorithms are typical machine
learning algorithms, and we avoid bias that one single method could bring into the detection.
Anomaly detection module detects intrusion based on the normal profile. Any crossing
traffic that deviates from the normal profile is categorized as an intrusion which triggers alert
generation and further detection or response. In anomaly detection, any observed behavior
that deviates significantly from the profile is considered as an abnormality.
Alert generation module triggers an alarm when an anomaly is identified by the anomaly
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detection module. Consequently, further detection may be called to verify the malicious be-
havior. Such further detection includes but are not limited to global detection, attack detection,
and attack source detection. Global detections and attacker tracing back are not addressed in
this paper as our focus in this work is to examine the performance of cross layer intrusion
detection mechanism and validate its performance by comparing with other single layered
design.
4.4 Anomaly Detection
In this section, we discuss the anomaly detection module. Some components in this mod-
ule is also used in data collection and profile training modules. Anomaly detection is based
on the premise that there are intrinsic and observable distinction between normal behaviors
and abnormal behaviors. Therefore, features with high information gain, which distinguishes
normal behaviors from anomalous behaviors, should be selected. In the following, we ana-
lyze threat models in WMNs first, then discuss feature selection based on threat models. The
description of classifiers are then followed.
4.4.1 Threats in Wireless Mesh Networks
Wireless mesh network are subject to the same basic threats common for wireless net-
work. In [24], the author analyzed the likelihood, impact and risk of threads at physical layer
and MAC layer to the security of the WiMAX/802.16 broadband wireless access technology.
Wireless mesh networks suffer from the same type of attacks. We summarize those threats
together with attacks [56] at network layer in Table 4.1.
Physical layer attacks are achieved by introducing a source of noise to reduce the capacity
of the channel. Those noise can be random (jamming) or purposely targeting specific frames
(scrambling). MAC layer suffer from masquerading attacks (identity theft and rogue base
station attack), DoS attacks, eavesdropping attack and message modification. In identity theft,
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an adversary configures its device to pretend to be some other mesh node. In rogue mesh
node attack, a rogue mesh node masquerades a legitimate mesh router to attract clients. At
the network layer, two major attacks are involved: one type of intrusions target to disrupt the
routing service by manipulating routing information such as sending false routing message or
misrouting packets. The other type of attacks breach the normal traffic pattern by dropping
data packets or corrupting packet contents.
In WMNs, intrusion at network layer can be classified into routing disruption and data for-
ward disruption. Routing disruption includes all types of attacks that disrupt routing service.
Data forward disruption attack includes all malicious behavior that disrupts data forwarding
service in WMNs.
4.4.2 Feature Selection
In anomaly detection, we want to select the trace data that bear evidence of normalcy or
anomaly. According to [68], MAC layer is to decide who gets access to the medium. A mali-
cious node may always get access to the medium, hence deny the service of other legitimate
nodes. As a result, a legitimate node may detect a broken link. At network layer, attackers can
target two different disruption: routing disruption and data forwarding disruption. Hence we
select those features that can bear those anomalies. In this section, we first define MAC layer
features and network layer features, respectively, then present feature sets for each layer.
MAC layer features: statistical values that reflect link state which includes but not limited
to loss rate, bandwidth, and link metrics.
Network layer features: statistical values that reflect routing activities. As we specified in
section 4.2, LQSR is a link state based dynamic source routing protocol. Every node peri-
odically sends out probe to measure its link forwarding probability and receiving probability
which are used to calculate loss probability on the link. If malicious node denies the service
on MAC layer, the link will eventually be broken due to high loss rate. Therefore, we select
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features on link information which includes link loss rate, bandwidth and the metric that is
used to measure link quality.
On network layer, LQSR keeps a link cache which functions as routing table to cache latest
and best route to destinations. Also the link cache records each node’s link information in the
network as every node broadcast their neighboring links periodically. As attacker targeting
network layer may disrupt normal routing activities features from routing traffic are logged.
For instance, our feature set at network layer includes statistical values of routing request,
route reply, routing error, and data packets. Also we select features from link cache. For
instance, the statistical value of route changes, link changes.
In summary, Table 4.2 shows the features selected from both MAC layer and network
layer.
Different routing protocols may have different features set. In our design, we select LQSR
as an example to demonstrate our intrusion detection prototype, which is implemented on the
testbed. On the other hand, our feature selection criteria can also by applied to other routing
protocols that are using routing quality as the routing metric. For instance, [34] use ETX as
routing metric and similar feature sets can be constructed.
Totally, there are 34 features includes in the anomaly detection model, as the average and
deviation statistics are used, so there are totally 34 * 2 features in the set. For network-based
intrusion detection, only the features in network layer are selected, resulting 20 * 2 features.
4.4.3 Classifier
We use three classifiers in our study. One is a decision-tree classifier, C4.5 (the implemen-
tation in Weka [78] is called J48). C4.5 is a typical classifier that computes rules from given
feature space to separate data into classes. Another classifier is Bayesian Network (BayesNet
algorithm in Weka) which builds probabilistic relationships among features. The encoded
Bayesian Network represents the dependencies between features set and classifiers. The last
67
one is a Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier, SMO. SMO constructs a separating hy-
perplane in the given feature space, one which maximizes the margin between the two data
sets.
4.5 Experimental Study
4.5.1 Wireless Mesh Network Testbed
The experimental results shown in this paper come from the wireless mesh network testbed,
consisting a network of 10 PCs. Each PC is installed with Microsoft Mesh Networking Aca-
demic Resource Toolkit [37] and is equipped with two wireless network interface cards. The
nodes are placed in offices on two consecutive floors of our computer science department
building. The setup is shown in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2 A wireless mesh network testbed. Each circle represents a node; the
large number is the node ID, and the superscript indicates the floor
number the node is on. 0 denotes basement.
The 10 nodes are all Dell PCs. Among them, two have 2.4GHz Intel Core2 CPU with
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3GB of memory. Two other PCs have 1.8GHz Intel Pentium 4 CPU with 512MB of memory.
The other six nodes have 3.8GHz Intel Pentium 4 CPU with 2.99GB of memory. They all
run Microsoft Windows XP. All of our experiments were conducted over IPv4 using statically
assigned addresses.
Each node has two 802.11 radios, connected to the PC via PCI slots. Each node has
one StarTech 802.11g Wireless PCI NIC Adapter, and also either a 3Com 11a/b/g Wireless
PCI Adapter or a Proxim ORiNOCO 11a/b/g PCI Card. Both StarTech NIC adapter and
ORiNOCO PCI card have external cable to optimize the placement of antenna. We separate
two cards’ antennas to one meter to reduce radio interference.
On each node, the two wireless interface cards are both configured in ad-hoc mode with
fixed frequency band and channel number. To minimize radio interference [37], we set StarTech
cards to use 802.11g with channel 11 and ORiNOCO PCI cards or 3Com PCI adapters to use
802.11a with channel 36. Such a static channel assignment allow each node to have up to 2
links with any of its neighboring node as they could communicate on channel 36 or channel
11.
4.5.2 Implementation of System Prototype
We have implemented our cross-layer based anomaly intrusion detection in the above
testbed. Specifically, the data collection module in our anomaly detection is embedded with
Microsoft ad-hoc routing framework - Mesh Connectivity Layer (MCL). Our data collection
module is incorporated with the implementation of MCL.
MCL is a loadable Windows driver [37]. This driver lies between layer 2 (the link layer)
and layer 3 (network layer). It is transparent to upper layer as it appears to be another Ethernet
link. To the lower layer, MCl appears to be another protocol running over physical link.
The MCL routes packet using LQSR. The LQSR implementation in MCL is derived from
DSR. It includes all the basic DSR functionality, including Route Discovery (Route Request
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and Route Reply messages) and Route Maintenance (Route Error messages). The data col-
lection module log all those routing related features from LQSR, which uses a link cache to
record all link related information. Therefore, the link related features are collected from the
link cache.
In the implementation of LQSR, WCETT is computed based on the link data. Our MAC
layer features are all gathered through the WCETT implementation.
Once the raw data is collected through our experiments, they are loaded into pre-process
module to generate statistical features. We apply a sliding window scheme to calculate the
average and standard deviation of the feature sets. We set a windows size to be k sampling
period, the average and standard deviation calculated from the k slots samples will be the
final trace data that can be loaded into classifier training module. Then the windows is slided
one slot to get the next feature record. When the sliding window reaches the end of the raw
data, only the data in the window size is calculated. As the testbed is not synchronized in our
implementation, sliding window can be used to avoid experimental bias.
4.5.3 Performance Evaluation
In our experimental study, we compared the performance of cross-layer based anomaly
intrusion detection with that of single layer base anomaly intrusion detection. The single
layer base anomaly intrusion detection includes only features collected from network layer.
Therefore, no link quality features are included in the profile training and intrusion detection.
Two metrics are measured in our comparison:
• Detection rate: also called true positive rate which represents the rate attacks are cor-
rectly detected. It is calculated as the number of true positives divided by the total
number of positives.
• False alarm rate: also called false positive rate which denotes the rate normal behaviors
are incorrectly identified as intrusions. It is calculated as the number of false alarms
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divided by the total number of alarms.
4.5.4 Attack Scenarios in WMNs
To measure the performance of cross layer based anomaly detection, we implemented three
different attacks that target at different layers of the network protocol stack: probe flooding
attack, greyhole attack, and blackhole attack. We select those three attacks because they are
typical attacks that can be launched by an adversary in wireless network and the damage they
can cause are severe.
Probe flooding In LQSR, each node periodically sends probe packets to measure its for-
warding rate and receiving rate on each of its outgoing links. By doing that, a mesh node
can measure the loss probability which is used to calculate the ETT value of that link. As the
RTS and CTS are disabled in our experiment, an attacker can launch probe flooding attack to
jam the medium. The malicious node gets extra access of the medium by increasing its probe
frequency. This attack is a type of DoS attack breaching the fairness at the MAC layer.
Blackhole attack Packet dropping is a very easy but effective attack as an attacker simply
drops incoming packets. In our implementation, the attacker drops all packet passing through
it which includes routing control packet, data packet, and any packets at MAC layer. This is a
cross layer attacks as both MAC layer and network layer are affected.
Greyhole attack Not like blackhole attacker where an adversary drops all incoming pack-
ets, greyhole attack only drops certain type of packets, packets from certain users, or packets
to certain destination. We implemented greyhole attack as an intrusion at network layer. The
attacker only drops routing control packets and data packets at network layer and with a certain
threshold (i.e. 10% of the network layer packets).
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Table 4.3 Performance of cross-layer based IDS (n=4)
J48 BayseNet SMO
Attack Type
Detection
Rate
False
Alarm
Rate
Detection
Rate
False
Alarm
Rate
Detection
Rate
False
Alarm
Rate
Probe Flooding Attack 99.8 0.1 98.6 2.9 99.9 0.0
Grey Hole Attack 98.7 0.3 96.7 0.0 97.7 0.0
Black Hole Attack 98.0 0.4 99.5 0.2 99.3 0.0
Table 4.4 Performance of network layer based IDS (n=4)
J48 BayseNet SMO
Attack Type
Detection
Rate
False
Alarm
Rate
Detection
Rate
False
Alarm
Rate
Detection
Rate
False
Alarm
Rate
Probe Flooding Attack 94.3 6.6 90.0 14.8 94.8 7.8
Grey Hole Attack 97.8 0.5 96.2 0.7 96.5 0.0
Black Hole Attack 95.7 1.1 95.1 1.0 98.2 0.3
4.5.5 Experimental Results
In our experiments, two phases are included: profile training and attack detection. Profile
training involves all normal network activities. Each node acts as a normal node. The logged
data is then used to train a profile model at each node. In attack detection phase, one node in
the testbed acts as an attacker running any of the above attacks. Then the data is loaded into
Weka for evaluation. Each attack runs for 10% of the running time and each experiment lasts
for an hour.
For each attack, we run 5 experiments. For each experiment, the detection rate and false
alarm rate at each normal node is calculated. The average results for the 5 experiments repre-
sent the performance of each IDS at every node. Then performance of IDSs over the network
is measured as the average results from each normal node. The final results are shown in Table
4.3 to Table 4.6. In our experiment, different network size are measured. Table 4.3 and Table
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Table 4.5 Performance of cross-layer based IDS (n=10)
J48 BayseNet SMO
Attack Type
Detection
Rate
False
Alarm
Rate
Detection
Rate
False
Alarm
Rate
Detection
Rate
False
Alarm
Rate
Probe Flooding Attack 97.12 0.32 96.46 0.66 97.63 0.07
Grey Hole Attack 94.76 2.23 89.90 3.88 94.36 2.11
Black Hole Attack 97.5 1.1 95.4 1.2 98.4 0.2
Table 4.6 Performance of network layer based IDS (n=10)
J48 BayseNet SMO
Attack Type
Detection
Rate
False
Alarm
Rate
Detection
Rate
False
Alarm
Rate
Detection
Rate
False
Alarm
Rate
Probe Flooding Attack 78.81 1.69 76.40 5.51 66.74 1.40
Grey Hole Attack 87.89 3.29 83.31 7.84 84.61 3.67
Black Hole Attack 94.8 1.4 93.4 2.5 95.0 0.5
4.4 display the performance of cross-layer based anomaly detection approach and network
layer based IDS, respectively, for a network with 4 nodes and Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 show
the results over the testbed with all 10 nodes. The detection rates and false alarm rate for all
three attacks using three different machine learning models are shown in the tables.
We observe that in both situations, cross-layer based IDS outperforms network layer based
IDS. Cross-layer based IDS has higher detection rate using any of the three anomaly models
and its false alarm rate is lower than network layer based IDS. For example, with a small
network (e.g. with 4 nodes) using BayseNet learning algorithm, the average detection rate for
cross-layer based IDS in detecting probe flooding attack is 8.6% higher than network layer
based IDS, and its false alarm rate is 11.9% lower than that of network layer based IDS on
average. In a larger network (e.g. with 10 nodes), cross-layer based anomaly detection using
SVM machine learning algorithm is almost 10% more accurate than network-layer based IDS.
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Figure 4.3 Detection rate for blackhole attack (n=4)
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Figure 4.4 False alarm rate for blackhole attack (n=4)
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Figure 4.5 Detection rate for greyhole attack (n=4)
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Figure 4.6 False alarm rate for greyhole attack (n=4)
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Figure 4.7 Detection rate for probe flooding attack (n=4)
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Figure 4.8 False alarm rate for probe flooding attack (n=4)
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Figure 4.9 Detection rate for blackhole attack (n=10)
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Figure 4.10 False alarm rate for blackhole attack (n=10)
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Figure 4.11 Detection rate for grey attack (n=10)
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Figure 4.12 False alarm rate for greyhole attack (n=10)
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Figure 4.13 Detection rate for probe flooding attack (n=10)
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Figure 4.14 False alarm rate for probe flooding attack (n=10)
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We notice that in detecting MAC layer attack - probe flooding attack - cross-layer based
IDS has more significant performance while comparing with network layer based IDS than
that in detecting the other two types of attacks. This is due to the fact that cross-layer based
IDS also monitors MAC layer activities. Features from both layers are loaded in profile train-
ing and intrusion detection.
Another observation is that out of the three learning models, SVM outperforms the other
two for both cross-layer based IDS and network layer based IDS. Either it has the highest
detection rate or it generates the smallest number of false alarms.
Comparing the performance of both IDSs in the two different size of networks, both IDSs
has average higher detection rate and lower false alarm rate in smaller networks. This is
due to the reason that smaller networks have short routes in data communication. Therefore,
more neighbor nodes can observe the misbehavior of an attack. Over the testbed with only
4 nodes, every node is within one hop distance of the other nodes. The attacker’s malicious
behavior can be observed by all the other 3 nodes. Therefore, the average detection is more
accurate. However, in a large network with 10 nodes, some nodes are 2 or 3 hops away from
the source of an attack, the malicious behaviors do not affect those faraway nodes comparing
with neighboring nodes, which causes lower detection accuracy in average.
In order to examine the different performance of cross-layer based IDS and network layer
based IDS at single node, we plot the detection rates and the corresponding false alarm rates
for both IDSs at each normal system. We do not put the results for the attacker as a malicious
node can not be trusted. Figure 4.3 to Figure 4.14 show the comparison results. Specifically,
Figure 4.3 to Figure 4.8 represents the results for the three different attacks at each of the 3
normal nodes in a 4 node wireless mesh network. And Figure 4.9 to Figure 4.14 show the
corresponding results for blackhole attack detection in a 10 node wireless network with one
node as the attacker.
For a small WMN (with 4 nodes), the cross-layer based method always outperforms the
network layer based IDS at each normal system with higher detection rate and lower false
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alarm rate. Especially, for probe flooding attack, cross-layer based IDS is much better than
network layer based IDS.
For a large WMN (with 10 nodes), the cross-layer based IDS still holds the trend to have
better performance than network layer based IDS. Even though node 3, 8, 9, the cross-layer
based IDS does not always has higher detection rate and false alarm rate than network layer
based IDS, it doesn’t change the fact that the cross-layer based IDS always outperforms net-
work layer based IDS.
4.6 Summary
In this paper, we have presented a cross-layer based anomaly detection system which trains
a normal profile from features collected from both MAC layer and network layer. Three ma-
chine learning algorithms are used for profile training and intrusion detection. A software
prototype of the IDS has been implemented over a wireless mesh network testbed. Experi-
mental studies have shown that cross-layer based IDS outperforms single layer based IDS: on
the average it provides higher detection rate and lower false alarm rate.
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CHAPTER 5. A GENERIC MODEL FOR INTRUSION RESPONSE
5.1 Introduction
Intrusion detection system (IDS) has attracted a lot of research in the past few decades and
has become highly sophisticated, enabling detection of various attacks. Intrusion response,
taking action to thwart an attack, is most conducted manually in existing systems. Network
administrators have to filter alarms generated by IDS to determine the most appropriate action
to take. These manual responses are inflexible and inefficient, especially in distributed sys-
tems such as recent wireless mesh network systems. Automated response is required in such
systems to respond accurately and quickly.
In most existing intrusion response work, a major concern is how to build the system re-
source model and use this model to derive the metrics to measure response cost, intrusion cost,
and response effectiveness. Many models have been used, including dependency trees [71],
graph models [43], and hierarchical tree models [22]. All of these approaches are based on
similar foundations which require a system expert or administrator to assign costs to specific
resources as well as to build the system model. The cost assignments to system resources,
services and users are then used to measure response damage, intrusion damage and response
effectiveness. However, directly assigning costs to specific resources is not an easy job for a
system administrator who manages the system, and may not be able to accurately estimate the
values of the resources in an organization. On the other hand, project managers or company
executives may have more accurate estimation for services, but lack the technical knowledge
to enumerate system resources. These difficulties have not been addressed in existing auto-
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mated response models.
Another drawback of existing models lies in their applicabilities. Most existing models
are only applied to estimate response costs, while damage cost evaluations are assumed to be
known. In contrast, we propose a generic model to estimate damage cost and response cost to
facilitate response action selection. The generic model provides consistency in cost evaluation
and response selection.
In this work, we propose to model a system with services and resources, in which services
are further divided into application services, component services, and system services and re-
sources are categorized to virtual resources and physical resources. We further present the
services and resources in a graph, called dependency graph, in which vertices denote services
or resources and edges show the dependencies among them. Each edge in the dependency
graph is also marked with appropriate values to describe the dependency weight among ser-
vices and resources. To estimate the value of each entity (e.g. a server or a resource) the value
of the overall system is first estimated by project managers or companies executives. Then the
total value of the system is propagated down to other services and resources. After that, the
dependency graph with propagated value can be used for damage cost estimation and response
cost evaluation according to the affected services and resources.
Our major contributions in this work lie in the following:
• We define a computer system with services and resources and model the system using a
dependency graph in which dependencies among services and resources are quantified.
• We describe a top-to-bottom method to propagate the value of a system entity from
application services down to physical resources.
• We provide a generic approach in measuring damage cost and response cost.
The rest of the chaper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides an overview of re-
sponse selection criteria. Section 5.3 presents the generic model. Section 5.4 describes the
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damage assessment utilizing the model, and section 5.5 shows the response cost estimation.
In section 5.6, response selection formulas are discussed. Section 5.7 describes two applica-
tions of our model and section 5.8 shows implementation of intrusion response system and
experimental results. In section 5.9 we discuss alternative cost propagation function. Other
extended usage of the model is also described in this section. Finally, we summarize our work
in section 5.10.
5.2 Response Selection Overview
In responding to an intrusion, a system administrator will take several factors into account
in selecting a corresponding action:
• Response Success (RS): Response success can also be called as response goodness. It
measures how effectively the corresponding response will thwart the intrusion. If a
response action will stop the attack completely then it has the full success. That is, the
response success should be at least equal to the cost caused by the damage.
• Operational Cost (OC): Deploying a response requires the effort of the system admin-
istrator and some other technical support. For instance, the system administrator often
needs to spend time selecting a response and launching the action. Cost in generating
reports or other related work is also calculated in the operational cost.
• Response System Impact (RSI): A lot of time, a response involves many aspects of the
system and may affect other services or resources running on the same system. This
effect is counted in response system impact. This is the side effect of an action in
responding to an attack.
• Response Durability (RD): RD is the expected duration of a response and might not
be as important as the other three factors. If two response actions will achieve the
same effect in the first three factors, the response that will keep the system longer from
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further attacks should be selected. In this case, response durability also reflects how
well a response will recover from an attack.
There are also other factors that can be put into the checklist when a response is selected. In
existing work, two major methods are used in response selection: One method selects response
based on the total cost of deploying a response action. The total cost is calculated by first
representing the above factors in a unified unit and then organizing them into a mathematical
formula. Another response selection method is based on sorting the importance in accounting
those costs. For instance, the system administrator may first select responses with the highest
response effectiveness. If more than one response are selected, then the one with the least
operation cost may be considered and response durability may come after that.
The two different response selection criteria can be applied to different systems. For ex-
ample, some system needs to respond to an intrusion using the most effective actions that can
minimize the damage of attack and the cost of the response is only considered after that. In
this case, priorities are used in choosing the appropriate response action. This normally ap-
plies to those systems in which the reputation is more costly. Other system may consider the
tradeoff of response effectiveness and the cost paid for deploying the response. The latter one
is practical as it may fit certain budget. In our model, the system administrator would have the
flexibility to choose either one of them or combines both in reacting to different attacks or in
different situation.
5.3 Generic Response Model
In this section, we will first show the description of a system which is divided into re-
sources and application services running above them. Then a generic dependency graph which
describes the dependency of services and resources in a system is defined, followed by cost
evaluation using this model.
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5.3.1 System Elements
A system is a generic term which could encompass a single host, a static network, or a
wireless ad-hoc network. It contains applications and resources that support these applica-
tions. The applications can be categorized as application services, component services, and
system/support services. The set of services is further denoted as S. Services can be any
instance of application services AS, component services CS, and system/support service SS.
The set of resources are denoted as R. Resources are further divided into virtual resources
V R and physical resources PR. The system model is divided into a layered structure.
• Application Services (AS): Application services are those services the system adminis-
trator cares about and has an intuitive sense of value for. These might include the web
service on a host or DNS service in a standard network. System administrators define
relative values for each of the security categories for each of these services.
• Component Services (CS): Component services are those which are user visible, but
are not directly used by users. These services typically are subfunctions to support
application services. For example, a voice over IP (VoIP) service is composed of VoIP
record and replay service, message sending and receiving service, buffer management
service, encoding and decoding service, and session management service.
• System/Support Services (SS): System/Support services are services which are required
to support component services, but which are not user visible. For instance, the kernel,
network service, and file system management service.
• Resources: Resources are either virtual resources (VR) or physical resources (PR) which
are required for services to function normally. Physical resources include real hardware
such as hard disk, memory, audio card and CPU. Virtual resources contain correspond-
ing driver software or objects stored in those physical resources. Examples are files,
sockets, inode, and audio driver. In general, virtual resources would be enough to be
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included into a system model. But in many wireless networks such as sensor networks
and mesh networks where physical attacks are inevitable, physical resources are also
needed in the model for cost evaluation.
For consistency, we call a service or a resource an entity, denoted as e.
5.3.2 Dependency Graph
In an IDS, alerts can result from abnormalities detected at the service level or at the re-
source level. As responses to detected intrusions, appropriate actions need to be deployed. It
is necessary to identify the cost such abnormalities may cause to the system as a whole. In
addition, system administrators need to estimate the potential impact a response may bring
against the system. The system administrator can determine the cost through values assigned
to low-level entities.
However, system administrators may not have an accurate intuition regarding system val-
ues to the organization as a whole. In addition, it is difficult to assign cost to low-level services
and resources when the system is large. To address these issues we create a graph model to
represent a system. This model only requires assigned values at the top-level where estimates
can be made more easily. Then the values can be propagated down to low-level entities in the
model. We will first give the definition of the dependency graph, then followed with the detail
of the propagation function.
Definition Dependency graph is defined as a pair (V,E) where V is the set of vertices
and E is the set of edges. Any v ∈ V is a tuple of the form (C, I, A) and we will use v[C]
to denote the first element of confidentiality, v[I] to denote the second element of Integrity
and v[A] for the last element of Availability in the tuple for the vertex v. We further define
VC = {v[C] | v ∈ V }, VI = {v[I] | v ∈ V }, VA = {v[A] | v ∈ V }. Finally, we define the edge
relation E ⊆ Z×Z where Z = VC∪VI∪VA. To simplify notation, we denote X = {C, I, A}.
A vertex v in a dependency graph represents an entity (e.g. a service or a resource). v[C]
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Figure 5.1 A generic system model
denotes the confidentiality of the vertex v, v[I] represents the integrity of the vertex v, and
v[A] is the denotation of the availability of the vertex v. An entity vi is dependent on another
entity vj if and only if there exists an edge in E from vi[x]→ vj[y], where x, y ∈ X .
Fig. 5.1 shows an example of dependency graph for a system in which only the depen-
dency relation between entities are presented. For instance, application service AS depends on
component service CS1, ..., CSm, virtual resource V Rl−1 relies on physical resource PRp−1
and PRp. Fig. 5.2 displays the E relation between C, I , A. For instance, the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of Si each depends on those of CSj, j ∈ 1, ..., n.
In Figure 5.3 the dependency graph of a Voice-over-IP (VoIP) system is presented. The
VoIP service is divided into eight sub components: recording, replaying, buffering, receiving,
sending, session management, encoding, and decoding. Those component services require the
support of system services. For instance, all eight component services are dependent on system
call; the decoding and encoding services rely on cryptography system; the sending, receiving
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Figure 5.2 An example of weight assignment
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Figure 5.3 Dependency graph of a VoIP application
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and session management services are dependent on TCP/UDP service; other system services
include process scheduling, process management and file system. All those system services
rely on virtual resources: audio driver, hardware driver, console driver, CPU management,
memory management, and network driver, whose functionalities depend on the corresponding
physical resources.
5.3.3 Cost Propagation Function
In the previous section we defined dependencies among services and resources. However,
different systems may have different security goals in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and
availability. Some systems may have strict requirements on confidentiality and other systems
may demand that availability has the highest priority. For instance, in a VoIP system, confi-
dentiality and availability are highly demanded as the service has to be available to customer
and the content of two end customers has to be confidential. In a web service, availability may
take the highest proportion of the system value. In addition, the dependencies among proper-
ties of services and resources vary in the same system. A good example is the web service.
The availability of a web service relies on the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of all
its component services. In order to reflect the inter-dependency, a weight is assigned to each
dependency edge. For example, the dependency weight between vi[x], vj[y] where x, y ∈ X
is denoted as wvi[x]→vj [y].
In the following, we show a simple approach in assigning dependency weights. In Fig.
5.2, application service Si is dependent on component services CS1, ..., CSn. Assume the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of Si are each equally dependent on the three security
properties of CSj , j ∈ {1, ..., n}. In the figure, Si[C] has 3n edges out of the vertex, each
points to CSj[x], x ∈ X . Each edge gets equal weight with the sum equal to 1. Therefore the
weight for each edge is calculated as wSi[C]→CSj [y] = 13n , j ∈ {1, ..., n}, y ∈ X . Other weights
can be calculated similarly.
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The weights are subjectively assigned by a system administrator or a system expert as they
know more details about the security goals and system configurations. Then the model can
be passed to managers or executives for value assignment. The monetary cost of application
services can be estimated according to their values to the whole company or institutes.
5.3.4 Cost Evaluation
In this section, we present the cost evaluation methodology for services and resources
based on the system model. The monetary value of an application service can be provided by
managers/executives as they have a better view of the value of application services to the total
economy value or the reputation of the company. Once the high level values are assigned, they
are propagated throughout the rest of the system based on the dependency graph.
We use Cv to denote the cost of vertex v, Cv[C], Cv[I], and Cv[A], respectively, to represent
the value of each element in vertex v. Before we show the propagation function, we will first
give two definitions. For any entity in the dependency graph, we define two costs: intrinsic
cost CI and dependency cost CD. The former defines the value of the inner functionalities of
entities and the latter expresses the dependency value propagating down to lower level entities
Cv = C
I
v + C
D
v
We divide the value of an entity into two values as the functionality of the entity is decided
by both its inner function and the function of dependent services or resources. When an attack
happens at a lower service in the system. However, the intrinsic cost of the upper layer service
may not be affected, only the dependency cost which relies on the lower service is affected.
To simplify calculation, we assign a percentage to the dependency cost to the total cost, which
we denote as Pd, then CDv = Cv × Pd, CDv = Cv × (1 − Pd). An application service is a
special case as its entire value will be propagated down, thus Pd = 1. For all vertex in the
lowest layer of the dependency graph, its dependency cost is equal to 0 as there are no more
dependent entities below them.
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In the following, we show the propagation function for cost evaluation of entities utilizing
the dependency model.
1. First, the organization assigns a value to the system (e.g. cost per unit time). This may
be derived through direct revenue, loss of productivity if the system is down, or whatever
other metric is appropriate. We will call this value Cs with a monetary value per unit
time.
2. Next, the organization divides this value between the services provided by the system.
If we choose our system to be a server, for example, an organization might assign half
of the value to the web service (b), and half to the mail gateway service (m) running on
the same server. We represent this by:
AS = {b,m} (5.1)
Cb = 0.5× Cs (5.2)
Cm = 0.5× Cs (5.3)
3. Given this value assignment, the next step is to divide the value between the security
goals of C, I , A. In our example, the web service is divided evenly between availability
and integrity, and the mail service is divided into half to availability, and a quarter each
to integrity and confidentiality:
Cb[C] = 0× Cb (5.4)
Cb[I] = 0.5× Cb (5.5)
Cb[A] = 0.5× Cb (5.6)
Cm[C] = 0.25× Cm (5.7)
Cm[I] = 0.25× Cm (5.8)
Cm[A] = 0.5× Cm (5.9)
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4. Once these assignments are made, the system dependency graph is used to propagate
these values to the other service and resource sets. A recursive algorithm can be used
here. The values of entities at one layer are determined by entities in the same layer and
the upper layer. For now we assume that this dependency model is provided, although
we will discuss some options for generating and updating such graphs further on.
Cv[x] =
∑
u∈V
(
∑
y∈X
(CDu[y] × wu[y]→v[x])) =
∑
u∈V
(
∑
y∈X
((Cu[y] × Pd)× wu[y]→v[x])), x ∈ X.
(5.10)
Notice that the above algorithm will compute the contribution of each entity to the value
of the overall system. As the total values of all applications services are propagated to the first
level of component services. Then that value is divided into intrinsic costs and dependency
costs. The dependency costs of component services are propagated down to system services,
and so forth. Therefore, the total value of all entities that do not fall into application service
set is equal to that of all the application service. That is, the following property holds for the
dependency graph: ∑
v∈V&v/∈AS
Cv =
∑
u∈AS
Cu
5.4 Damage Assessment
Given the dependency graph of a system with the cost evaluated at services and resources,
we can use it for cost assessment when a cost of the system is involved. In this section, we
show how the intrusion cost can be assessed based on the system model.
For different types of attacks various damage evaluation methods would be applied as the
system administrator would have different level of knowledge about the detected intrusion. For
some attacks, we may have exact view of its penetration track and the services and resources
they affected. The system administrator can map its attack pattern to the corresponding ser-
vices and resources in the dependency graph. the cost of all affected entities in the dependency
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graph will be summed up as the total cost of the intrusion. As the same attack might cause
different impact on different systems, its severity will be reflected by the functionality loss to
each of its security category. That is, the percentage loss of its confidentiality, integrity, or
availability will be measured. For some other attacks that only partial information is available,
default actions can be used for cost evaluation. In the following, the algorithm in measuring
damage costs for the three different scenarios are presented:
1. Known attack with signature detected: A signature-based intrusion detection means the
attack pattern can be identified. That is, the affected services and resources are known.
When mapping those services and resources to the dependency graph the damage cost
can be measured.
• A set of entities that are affected by the attack is represented as vi, i ∈ 1, ...,m.
• The system administrator estimates the damage severity using a function loss rate
which represents the reduction of the corresponding functionality. For instance, we
use loss rate of ri[C], ri[I], and ri[A], respectively, for the loss of confidentiality,
integrity, and availability.
• The damage cost can be calculated as the sum of all lost intrinsic cost:
DC =
∑
i∈{1,...,m}
∑
x∈X
(CIvi[x] × ri[x])
2. Unknown attack with known affected entities In this case, the signature of the attack
is unknown. However, the affected services and resources are detected. We can use
the same way for known attack to calculate the intrusion damage. That is, the cost of
affected entities are added together for the damage cost.
3. Unknown attack This is a scenario when new attacks are first detected. The installed
intrusion detection system is not able to identify the signature of the attack from its rule
storage. And no breach on the services or resources can be monitored. The symptom
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of the attack is that some application services might be cracked down. For instance,
some services might crash or its loss of availability can be monitored. In this scenario,
the system administrator measures the damage cost by estimating the direct loss to the
system. For example, if a web site is attacked by unknown attacks, the system adminis-
trator may measure the damage cost by estimating the monetary loss of the attack. This
can be set to be default in damage estimation. Some parameter can also be set to default,
for instance, the loss rate for confidentiality, integrity and availability.
5.5 Response Cost Evaluation
In responding to an intrusion there may be multiple choices in thwarting an intrusion.
However, a cost-based model should give higher priority for the response action that causes
less cost both in terms of operation cost and negative system impact. In the following, we
analyze the three components of response cost: operation cost (OC), response system impact
(RSI), and response success (RS).
5.5.1 Operation Cost
Operating cost contains the labor work load involved in deploying the response action. It
can be measured as monetary cost in assigning system administrator or technicians in applying
the response actions.
5.5.2 Response System Impact
Another component of response cost contains the impact the response brings to the system.
Here the system dependency graph can be used. For a response action, the resources and
services the response will indirect can be identified. We denote the set as S. Assume the set
of vertices affected by the attack is denoted as T . Then the response system impact includes
values of all entities affected by the response action, but not by the intrusion. Here we assume
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the response will have positive affects on resources damaged by attacks.
RSI =
∑
vi∈S&vi /∈T
∑
x∈X
(CIvi[x] × dvi[x]) (5.11)
Where d is the percentage of the response action, which will affect the entity. It takes value in
the range of [0, 1].
5.5.3 Response Success
Response success describes how well the response will perform in thwarting the attack.
Possible response actions are normally saved in the system in preparation for intrusion re-
sponse. The entities that the response might invoke can be mapped to the dependency graph.
Upon detection of intrusion, corresponding response list will be scanned. The set of entities
affected by response actions will be compared with those affected by the attack. Only those
entities included in sets will be counted in estimating the value of RS. The calculation is shown
as follows.
RS =
∑
vi∈S&vi∈T
∑
x∈X
(CIvi[x] × rvi[x]) (5.12)
5.6 Response Selection
In the previous section, we have shown how the dependency graph will be used in esti-
mating damage cost, response cost, and response success. All those parameters are applied
to the metric defined in [64, 65] to select a response. Depending on the system requirements
specified in section 5.2, different methods could be used in response selection. The basic form
of this metric is:
EV = RS − (RSIr +OCr) (5.13)
In the above formula, EV represents expected value, which is a measure of value gained by
deploying a response in a specific attack context. Values of EV above 0 indicate that the
response is worth deploying, and values below 0 indicate that the response will do more harm
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than benefit. RS denotes response success, or the amount of damage potentially caused by
this intrusion which will be mitigated by deploying a specific response. RSIr is the value for
response system impact of response r and OCr is the value operational cost of response r.
In the calculation, the values of RS, RSIr, and OCr are normalized such that the quantity of
EV is in the range of (−1, 1).
The first part (RS) of the formula denotes how well the responding action will cover the
damage caused by the intrusion. The value of this part would be between 0 and 1. If it is 0,
then the response can not cover any of the intrusion damage cost. If it is greater than 0, then
the response can cover some part of the intrusion damage.
The second part (RSIr + OCr) represents the cost the response will bring to the system.
It will also be in the range (0, 1), where 0 indicates no cost to deploy, and 1 indicates a cost
equal to the entire value of the system.
Therefore, EV give the expected value, relative to the total value of the system, that is
associated with a particular response in the context of a specific attack scenario. Full details
on the cost computation and components of the function are in [65].
5.7 Scenarios
We provide two different systems to show the application of the generic response model.
One system is a wireless mesh network and the other one is a web service system running over
a wireless mesh network testbed. In the following, we describe the dependency graph of the
two systems and show the attacks and intrusion responses implemented above them. In the
next section, we use the wireless mesh network as an example to show the implementation of
an intrusion response system and the experimental results.
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5.7.1 Wireless Mesh Network System
The mesh network is composed of three nodes. Each node is equipped with two wireless
interface cards (NICs). On one NIC, the Optimized Link State Routing Protocol (OLSR)
[33] is running for network connectivity. The other NIC is configured for packet sniffing. It
monitors network traffic within its transmission range.
We also implement a computer worm to simulate network intrusion. One of the devices
in the network is initialized as the source of the computer worm. It selects targets from the
routing table and utilizes Hello message in OLSR for worm transmission. Once a victim node
is attacked, the worm starts to affect other machines in the network from that compromised
node. The step will be repeated until no target can be found. More detailed implementation
can be found in [50].
5.7.2 Web Service System
In the web service system, an Open Services Gateway Initiative (OSGI) [7] server is in-
stalled. Figure 5.4 shows the dependency graph of the web service which is dependent on two
other web services - temperature service and speech service - which are exported by OSGI
server through its component services - Http service and Axis service. The OSGI service is
running on a java virtual machine.
The application is a temperature monitoring service which gets temperature reading from
the temperature service and compares it with a threshold. If the value is bigger than the
threshold the speech service is called to trigger an alarm.
In our implementation, the dependency weight on the confidentiality, integrity, and avail-
ability of services is set to default values:
∀x ∈ X, u[x]− > v[y], x, y ∈ X|∃(u, v) ∈ E
The weight on each dependency link for a single node (u[x]|u ∈ V, x ∈ X) is equally as-
signed. We use Pd = 0.5.
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5.7.2.1 Attack and Response Implementation
We simulate two attacks in the system:
• Web Service Attack: The attacker changes the value exported from the OSGI service to
the web service such that alarms will be triggered.
• DoS Attack: The attacker reads temperature infinitely which cause the OSGI server
(includes OSGI service, Http service, and Axis service) crash.
In Table 5.1, we list the affected services and the corresponding responses for the two
intrusions.
Table 5.1 Attacks and intrusion responses
Type of Attack Affected Entities Responses
Web Service Attack temperature web service reboot OSGI service
DoS Attack OSGI service, Http service,
Axis service
reboot service, apply
access limitation
5.8 Experimental Results
In this section, we are using the wireless mesh network system as an example to show the
implementation of intrusion response system and experimental results.
5.8.1 Dependency Graph
In Figure 5.5 the dependency graph of the wireless mesh network is presented. The graph
shows the services that the DNS service is dependent on. Unlike a local service which solely
based on local services, DNS is a network service which requires services from all hosts in the
network. Figure 5.5 reveals such relationship. For instance, the DNS service is dependent on
the transport layer service TCP and UDP at each host. Sequentially, TCP and UDP services at
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Figure 5.4 Dependency graph of a web service system
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Figure 5.5 Dependency graph of a mesh network with OLSR routing protocol
(different colors are used to mark services running on different hosts)
each node are supported by OLSR routing service which relies on the functionality of network
driver which controls physical network interface card (NIC).
5.8.2 Implementation of Intrusion Response System
We develop an intrusion response system over the wireless mesh network. Figure 5.6
shows the system architecture. The response system is composed of two modules: intrusion
detection module and intrusion response module/engine. The detection module includes dif-
ferent detection sources which are different intrusion detection tools. Using multiple intrusion
detection tools can overcome the disadvantage of false alarms inherited in intrusion detection.
Once an alert is triggered, the intrusion response engine will be invoked for response selection
and deployment. Corresponding information is sent to the response engine through socket.
The intrusion response engine is further divided into initialization module, response se-
lection module, and response deployment module. The initialization module pre-loads the
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Figure 5.6 Intrusion response engine
engine with the dependency graph which is specified in an XML file. This file also includes
a list of response actions and their affecting services and resources in the system. All those
information is loaded into the engine during its initialization. For different system, different
dependency graphs may specified in the XML, similar to the response implementation.
Once the intrusion response engine starts, it invokes response selection module to choose a
proper response action. In this module, factors of operation cost, response system impact, and
response success of each response are calculated. Then the expected value EV is computed.
The response with the highest EV value which represents the highest gain will be selected.
Then the response deployment module will call the corresponding script to start the response.
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5.8.3 Implementation of Responses
In response deployment, some responses are general, such as stopping a process, restarting
a process, and rebooting the system. Some other responses are specific to certain attacks. In
the wireless mesh network, different thwarting actions are implemented based on different
detection point of the worm attack. In the following, we first show the attacking process of a
worm, then describe the reaction activity and detection results.
Figure 5.7 lists the steps when a worm at Host affects another machine Target:
1. The Host machine sends a crafted Hello message to the Target machine
2. The Target machine copies the message without checking its size which causes buffer
overflow. Eventually, the Target machine opens a port for the Host machine.
3. The Host machine connects to the Target machine through the opened port.
4. The Target machine sends requests for the worm using Trivial File Transfer Protocol
(TFTP).
5. The binary code of the worm will be copied from Host to Target which will start the
above process again.
In the wireless mesh network, Snort can detect different stages of worm attack. Accord-
ingly, three different responses are implemented:
• Block attacker’s IP: When a worm transmission is detected (step 5) in the neighborhood
the third party node will set up firewall rules to block their IPs.
• Restart OLSR daemon: When a node is affected its own Snort can detect that and restart
the OLSR daemon. We assume that when a machine is affected by a worm its IDS can
continue to function.
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Figure 5.7 Attacking steps for a computer worm
• Stop TFTP protocol and restart the process: When a node detects a worm is transmitting
to itself, it stops TFTP protocol and restarts the process.
5.8.4 Performance Evaluation
We implement a prototype of our intrusion response system. The dependency graph, attack
information and response information are all saved in an XML file and loaded into the system
when the intrusion response system starts. We first show the results with intrusion response in
the network. Then the performance of the prototype is measured.
Figure 5.8 shows an example of the worm propagating process in the network without
deploying intrusion response system. In each step, the worm selects a host as target and tries
to copy itself to the victim. For example, in step 1, the worm at Host2 copies itself to Host3.
Then it selects Host1 as the target and affects Host1 in step 2. In step 3, the worm at Host3
chooses Host1 as target. However, Host1 has been affected in step 2, then it selects Host2
as the target and affects it. After five steps, all three hosts in the network are affected by the
worm and all OLSR daemons die. No network connection is detected in the network.
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Figure 5.8 An example of worm attack
To compare the results with intrusion response, we install the intrusion response system at
each host. The results we observed are as follows:
• In step 1, Host1 detects a worm transmission within its neighborhood. The response
engine at Host1 selects to Block attacker’s IP. Then the IP address from Host2 will be
added into its firewall and traffic from Host2 will be blocked.
• At the same time, the intrusion detection module at Host3 detects that a worm is trans-
mitting to itself. Therefore, the response Stop TFTP protocol and restart the process
will be deployed. OLSR daemon will be restarted.
• When Host2 tries to send a crafted Hello message to Host1 in step 2, it will be blocked
by the firewall at Host1 due to the response in step 1.
• Because of the deployment of intrusion response system, the computer worm failed to
affect the network. All three daemons are running and all three nodes are connected by
OLSR.
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We further evaluate the performance of our intrusion response system. Four metrics will
be used for the performance measurement:
• detection time: the time from the attack starts till the attack is detected.
• response preparation time: the time from the detection of an attack to the alarm reaches
the response engine.
• response selection time: the time from the response engine is triggered till the response
action is selection.
• response deployment time: the time from response action is selected till the response is
deployed.
Table 5.2 Performance of response selection system
Metric Value
detection time 0.215031 s
response preparation time 4.247133 s
response selection time 0.037682 s
response deployment time 0.036622 s
Table 5.2 shows the performance of one response selection system based on the wireless
mesh network. The results are the average value of 10 experiment rounds. Generally, the
response system performs well as it has very short time in selection. However, from the
results, the response preparation time is much larger than the other three. This is due to our
implementation of the connection between intrusion detection system and response system.
In the prototype, the response engine periodically scans the intrusion detection for alerts. The
period is set to 1 second. When an intrusion is detected, it has to wait for the call from the
response system. A more efficient way should allow the intrusion detection system to trigger
the response engine whenever it is necessary.
Figure 5.9 shows the results for systems with different number of resources. The resources
range from 20 to 10000 which also denotes the size of the dependency graph. As the size of
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Figure 5.9 Performance of intrusion response system (t1: intrusion detection
time, t2: response preparation time, t3: response selection time, t4:
response deployment time)
the dependency graph increases, the detection time and response time increase. However, our
response system scales very well as it takes less than 0.5 seconds for intrusion detection and
response for a large system with 10000 resources.
5.9 Discussion
5.9.1 Alternative Cost Evaluation
In the previous section, the cost of an entity is divided into intrinsic cost and dependency
cost. Only the dependency cost is propagated down to other entities. An alternative method of
propagating cost is based on the idea that the functionality of one entity is entirely dependent
on other entities. This method can catch the situation when one service is solely dependent on
other services. In this case, the cost evaluation method for both response and damage would
change as the total value can not exceed that of the application service.
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5.9.2 Graph Extension
In addition for response selection, the dependency graph can also be used in other ways.
In response to new attacks, the dependency graph can be used to analyze the possible effect
of the attack and identify the scope of the attack to the system. For instance, if the high level
service is not affected, the lower level services or resource on which they rely on should not
be affected.
Another usage of the dependency graph is to identify key components of the system. Those
entities that have the most number of incoming arrows should be guarded by high security level
as their failure may cause high cost to the system.
The dependency graph can by extended to provide further details in describing the system.
For example, some service component can be further granulated to provide more details of
the dependency relationship among entities which can evaluate the response cost and damage
cost. At the same time, a large graph can be involved in the calculation and more computation
will be invoked. Therefore, it has to be balanced.
5.10 Summary
In this work, we provide a generic model for cost-based intrusion response. A dependency
graph is used to represent system resources, services, and the dependency among them. We
define the cost propagation function which propagate application value down to component
services, system services, and resources. Upon intrusion detection and response, the depen-
dency graph is used for damage assessment and response selection.
To evaluate the intrusion response model, we implement a prototype over two different
systems: a wireless mesh network system and a web service system. We show the system
dependency graph and measure the performance. Experiments results show that our intrusion
response model is effective and scalable.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this chapter, we summarize our work, review contributions, and discuss the future work.
6.1 Conclusion
WMNs have been a cost-effective technology that provides wide-coverage broadband net-
work services. They benefit both service providers with low cost in network deployment,
and end users with ubiquitous access to the Internet from anywhere at anytime. However, as
WMNs proliferate, security and privacy issues associated with this communication paradigm
become more and more evident and thus should be addressed.
Providing a security system is not an easy job as many aspects have to be considered: In-
trusion prevention in which security designs are embedded within the mechanisms; as WMNs
are vulnerable to malicious attacks, intrusion prevention are not enough in protecting the net-
work. Thus intrusion detection has to be deployed as a second line of defense to detect attacks
in front of unauthorized activities. Once intrusion are monitored and detected, response ac-
tions are needed to thwart attacks and minimize the damage caused by the attack. Such a
system is referred to as intrusion response system.
In addressing those problems, we provide a systematic framework to protect WMNs. In
particular, our research work includes the following major contributions:
1. we proposed a heterogeneity-aware group key management framework which com-
bines the logical key hierarchical technique together with distributed threshold-based
techniques in WMNs. We also developed a specific implementation of the group key
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management framework which addresses the techniques involved in integrating the two
different key management schemes. Among them, we provide a Bloom Filter based
authentication method and a solution to management member node mobility. The fol-
lowed analysis and simulation results verify that the proposed method reduces rekeying
delay and storage overhead at end nodes with minimum communication cost at back-
bone nodes.
2. We have presented a cross-layer based anomaly detection system which trains a normal
profile from features collected from both MAC layer and network layer. Three machine
learning algorithms are used for profile training and intrusion detection. A software pro-
totype of the IDS has been implemented over a wireless mesh network testbed. Exper-
imental studies have shown that cross-layer based IDS outperforms single layer based
IDS: on the average it provides higher detection rate and lower false alarm rate.
3. We provide a generic model for intrusion response. Dependency graph is used to rep-
resent system resources, services, and the dependency among them. We define the cost
propagation function which propagate application value down to component services,
system services, and resources. Upon intrusion detection and response, the dependency
graph is used for damage assessment and response selection.
We have conducted extensive simulations to evaluate the performance of our heterogeneity-
aware group key management. To evaluate cross-layer based intrusion detection system, we
have built a WMN testbed and a system prototype has been implemented. Our intrusion re-
sponse system is also implemented on the testbed.
6.2 Future Work
Up to now, not many research efforts have been devoted to security issues in WMNs. This
thesis provides our initial work in this respect. As a very promising research area, there are
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several interesting and important future directions:
• Explore heterogeneity in other security design in WMNs, which integrates various net-
works requiring new design leverage such as heterogeneity.
• Instead of installing IDS at every node in WMNs, optimal solution can be studied for
deployment of distributed IDS in WMNs.
• Extend generic intrusion response model to other system environment. This generic IRS
can be applied in other system.
• Integrate the cross-layer based intrusion detection system and intrusion response system
such that a complete IDS/IRS can be implemented.
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